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ACKNOWLEDGMENT.

See DEED, 1.
ACTION. See ADMINISTRATOR, 1. SUNDAY, 2. TORT, 1.
1. No action lies to recover excessive freight paid to a railroad, in the absence of any duress, fraud or extortion. Potoinac Coal Co. v. C. 4- R. Railroad, 191.
2. No action lies to recover money voluntarily paid, even if the party
supposed he was bound in law to pay it. Lfetyette 4 Indianapolis R. R. v.
Pattison, 252.
3. Money paid under duress either applied to property or the person may
be recovered. id.
4. A person whose horses, frightened by a locomotive, became uncontrollable, ran away with him, went upon land of another, and broke a post there,
is not liable for the damage if it was not caused by any fault on his part.
Brown v Collins, 364.
5. Where debtor alleges that he transferred notes and mortgages to his
creditor to collect them, and pay himself, and hand over surplus, and that
there is a surplus, an action at law is stated and not one in equity. Dickson
v. Cole, 587.
6. If the creditor releases a mortgage-debt received as collateral having
taken a conveyance of the land, without the debtor's consent, he is liable to
account to him for the amount. Id.
7. A party declining to accept payment except in a way to which he is not
entitled, cannot insist that the action is prematurely brought. Macky v. DIIlinger, 389.
8. Threats of bodily hurt which occasion such inconvenience as to produce
pecuniary damage are actionable. Grimes v. Gates et ux., 645.
9. A mere fear is not sufficient. Id.
10. Where threats are made by letter it is only necessary to set out the
substance of the threats. Id.
11. Where plaintiff was induced to buy a patent-right, by the false and
fraudulent representationt of defendant, an action on the case will lie. Soiners
v. Richards, 773.
12. Plaintiff need not prove all the allegations of the declaration, if less
will constitute cause of action. Id.
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ADMINISTRATOR.
1. An action for injury to real estate does not survive to an administrator.
Forist v. Androscogqin R. I. Co., 50.
2. To sui-ain such action under the statutes of New Hampshire, tie facts
on which administrator's right depends must he stated in declaration. Id.
ADMIRALTY. See NAVIGATION, 2.
1. The United States Courts have exclusive jurisdiction over maritime contracts. Marlhg v. Mobjile Trade Co., 50.
2. The common-law remedy saired by the Act of 1789, is a remedy which
attaches to the interests of the owner of the vessel. Id.
3. Supplies furnished in Mobile, to a steamboat plying between there and
Columbus, the owner being a citizen of Mississippi, is a maritime contract. Id.
4. The proceedings in admiralty embraced in R. C. 3127-3147 are inoperative in all cases of maritime contract. Id.
5. In admiralty, the pendency of proceedings in personam cannot suspend
those in rein. People ex re. Granger v. Hayne Circuit Judge, 389.
6. Courts cannot treat them as involving identical issues. Id.
7. An appeal in admiralty from the District Court, in effect, institutes the
matter de nero in the Circuit Court. Tie Lucille, 587.
8. An order merely affirming the dec:ee of the District Court is not such
as the Circuit Court should make, and no appeal lies to Supreme Court. Id.
9. In case of collision the inferential evidence of the officers of the colliding vesel. will not weigh against the direct testimony of those of injured
-one. The Jl'enona, 645.
10. A false manwuvre at the moment of collision on the part of a schooner,
-will not exonerate a steamer which had nothing to mislead it. The Falcon,
-645.
11. Where libel alleged total loss, which answer substantially admitted,
the fact that the vessel was finally repaired is no defence. ]d.
12. A decree for total loss-is a bar to any claim by the former owners of
a vessel. Id.
13. Where a steamer running seven knots in a dense fog and approaching
Sandy Hook, collides with a bark under way and ringing a bell, the damages
will be equally divided. The Penn.Ijlania, 646.
14. A vesq.l committing a positive breach of statute must show that it 'ertainly did not contribute to a disaster. Id.
AGENT. See EVIDENCE, 27. INSURANCE, 19, 21. RAILROAD, I0. TRoven,
1. UeuRY-, 5.
1. A general agent is one who is authorized to transact all the business of
his principal, or all of a particular kind or at a particular place. Cruzan v.
Smith, 194.
2. The principal is hound by the acts of a general agent, although he may
have violated private instructions. Id.
3. A special agent is one authorized to do a specified act. Id.
4. Principal is not bound by act of special agent if he exceeds his aruthority. Id.
5. Third parties must ascertain extent of special agent's authority. Id.
6. Where a company issues to a person an open policy with blanks for the
risks agreed upon by him, and authority to take the premiums, he is to be
deemed their agent. Wass v. iMaine Alarine Insurance Co., 259.
7. Commercial agents have no right to sell the merchandise of their principal as part of a lot, without his consent. Coes v. Nash, 451.
8. SPECIAL A-ENCY, 657.
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AGREEMENT.
An agreement to extend the time of payment of a note, to be valid, must
be supported by a consideration. lfarcellus v. Countryimen, 261.
ALIEN.

See

TERRITORIES,

I.

1.The police power of the state may be exercised by precautionary measures against the increase of crime or pauperism, or the spread of inlietions
diseases from persons coming from other countries. The state may entirely
with incurable disease ; may refi-e adexclude convicts and persons afflicted
mission to paupers, idiots and lunatics and others, who from physical causes
are likely to become a charge upon the public until security is afforded that
they will not become such a charge; and may isolate the temporarily diseased
until the danger of contagion is gone. In the 3Matter ofAh Fong, 761.
2. The extent of the power of the state to exclude a foreigner fron iti territory is limited by the right of self-defence. Whatever outside of the legitimate exercise of this right affects the intercourse of foreigners with our people, their immigration to this country and residence therein, is exclusively
within the jurisdiction of the general government, and is not subject to state
control or interference. Id.
3. The 6th Article of the Treaty between the United States and China,
adopted on the 28th of July 1868, provides that Chinese subjects visiting or
residing in the United States shall enjoy the same privileges, immunities and
exemptions in respect to travel or residence as may there be enjoyed by citizens or subjects of the most favored nation, and as the general government
has not seen fit to attach any limitation to the ingress into the United States
of subjects of those nations, none can be applied to the subjects of China. Id.
4.'The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution declares that no state
shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without ttle process of
law ; nor deny to any person the equal protection of the laws ; Held, that
this equality of protection implies not only equal accessibility to tle courts
for the prevention or redress of wrong', and the enforcement of rights, but
equal exemption with others of the same class, from all charges and burdens of every kind. Within these limits the power of the state exists, as
it did previously to the adoption of the amendment, over all matters of internal police. Id.
5. On the 31st of May 1870, Congress passed an act declaring that "no
tax or charge shall be imposed or enforced by any state upon any person
immigrating thereto from a foreign country which is not equally imposed or
enforced upon every person immigrating to such state from any other foreign
country, and any law of any state in conflict with this provision is hereby
declared null and void ;" Held, ist. That the term charge, as here used, means
any onerous condition, and includes a condition which makes the right of an
immigrant, arriving in the ports of the state, to land within the state depend
upon the execution of a bond by a third party, not under his control, and
whom he cannot constrain by any legal proceedings ; and, 2. That the statute
of Calilbrnia, which prohibits foreign immigrants of certain classes, arriving
in the state of California by vessel, from landing until a bond shall have
been given by the master, Qwner or consignee of tile vessel that they will not
become a public charge, and imposes no condition upon immigrants of the
same class entering the state in any other way, is in conflict with the Act of
Congress. Id.
AMENI)MENT. See ARBITRATION, 3. PLEADING, 5.
1. Additional counts to a declaration in trespass q. c. f. without alleging
the breaking of a close, complained of the taking of certain logs. Held that
tile amendment did not change the original cause of action. Knapp v.
Hartung, 451.
2. Plaintiff may add count different from declaration if he does not change
cause of action. Id.
3. This applies to actions ex delicto, as well as ex contractu. Id.
4. The name of an additional plaintiff maybe added in ejectment, after suit
brought. Kaul v. Lawrence, 521.
5. An amendment should not be allowed so as to deprive the opposite party
of any right. Id.
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AMENDMENT.
6. A party cannot introduce a new cause of action by amendment.

Kaul

v. Lawrence, 521.

7. It is the settled rule in Wisconsin that a party cannot by amendment
change his caue or action nor the nature of his defence. Supervisors of Keweaunee Co. v. Decker, 646.
APPLICATION OF PAYMENTS.
Where payments are made generally they may be applied by the creditor to
such items of the account as are not secured. Murphy v. iWebber, 256.
APPRENTICE.

See DAMAGES, 1.

ARBITRATION.
1. An award that shows on its face that but two nut of three arbitratori
heard and deliberated cannot he sustained. Bartoleft v. Dixon, 389.
2. It need not appear that nllthe referees heard and deliberated, the presumption is that when not made by all that the minority refuaed to join. Id.
3. In an action on an award it is discretionary with the court to allow an
ift.Vord v. 01cSpaden, 704.
amendment to the answer tf the defendant.
4. It is not error to permit the defendant to state the differences between
fr the purpose of showing that the arbitrators acted
himself and the plaintiff.o
on matters not submitted to them. Id.
5. The statement of any faict, hearing Upon the question of whether arbitrators were guilty of any misconduct, is allowable in an action on an award.
Id.
ASSUMPSIT.
1. Taxes voluntarily paid by the plaintiff on land in possession of the defendant, without his request, cannot be recovered from defendant. Bryant V.
Clar', 51.
2. Where plaintiff pays thedefendant, a constable, the amount of an execution
in his hands against him, with the fee. for the collection, he cannot recover the
fees so paid. Slralrord v. Blaisdell, 51.
3. A party who furnishes a supper to a large numberof men, may recover the
price from the ones who ordered it, though the supper was the result of a bet
Vinchester v. Nutter, 53.
on a squirrel hunt.
4. Where a party has unlawfully sold securities belongin, to another, the
latter may waive the fraud and sue in assu pstt. Allen v. United States, 326.
ATTACHMENT. See BAILBIENT, 2. INsuR.ANCE, 14.
ATTORNEY. See SHtERFF, 2.
1. The provisions of the statute for the suspension of an attorney being
penal, must be strictly construed. Klinqensnith v. Kepler, 192.
2. An attorney cannot be suspended from practice by the default of his partner. Md.
3. The power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts ; its existence
is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the
enforcement of the judgments, orders and writs of the courts, and consequently to the due administration of justice. The moment the courts of the
United States were called into existence and invested with jurisdiction over
any subject, they became possessed of this power. Ex parle Robinson, 435.
4. The Act of Congress of March 2d 1831, entitled "an act declaratory
of the law concerning contempts of court," limits the power of the Circuit
and District Courts of the United States to three classes of cases : 1st, where
there has been misbehavior of a person in the presence of the courts, or so
near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice ; 2d, where there
has been misbehavior of any officer of the courts in his official transactions;
and, 3d, where there has been disobedience or resistance by any officer
party, juror, witness or other person, to any lawful writ, process, order
rule, decree or command of the courts. Id.
5. The 17th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, in prescribing fine or
imprisonment as the punishment which may be inflicted by the courts of the
United States for contempts, operates as a limitation upon the manner in
which their power in this respect may be exercised, and is a negation of al
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ATTORNEY.
other modes of punishment. Ex'parte Robinson, 435.
6. The power to disbar an attorney is possessed by all courts which have
authority to admit attorneys to practice. But tile
power can only be exercised
where thiere has been such conduct on the part of the party complained of as
shows him to be unfit to be a member of tile prolession ; ani" befbre judgment
disbarring him can be rendered he should have notice of the grounds of coinuI.
plaint against him and ample opportunity of explanation and defence.
7. Mandamus is tile appropriate remedy to restore an attorney di.harred
where the court below has exceeded its jurisdiction in the matter. Id.
AUCTION.
Where a sale by auction is announced as " positive" it is fraud for
yen lor to employ others to keep up the price by bidding.
'alsh v. Barton,
647.
AWARD. See ARBITRATION.
BAILMENT. See BANK AND BANKER, 6. SHERIFF, I.
1. Where unfinished property is held by a creditor as collateral security,
and is finished by him, equity will compel the payment of tile
creditor's disbursenents before any application is made on the debt. lowan v. State Bank,
53
2. The creditor's equity is superior to that of an attaching creditor. Id.
3. An agreement for tile
sale of property which the vendee promises to
hold in his possession is a contract of bailment. Johnston v. lVhitteinore, 389.
4. If the bailee sells or converts bailor may maintain trover for it. Id.
5. Where specific securities which have been delivered to one, are surrendered to another, trover or a special 'action for damages is the proper action
and not assunipsit. Barnum v. Stone and Berry, 389.
BANK AND BANKER. See INSOLVENT, 3.
1. Bank directors will be held responsible to the depositors for the loss
or conversion by the bank of special deposits in such bank, whenever they
know of such conversion, or might have known of it by the exercise /of such
affairs
care and diligence as the law requires of such officers in representing tile
of the bank. United Society of Shakers v. Underwood, 211.
2. Batik directors mu~t be considered as affected with the knowledge of such
facts as appear upon the bank books. Id.
3. A receiver appointed under the 50th section of the National Banking
Act may sue for demands due the bank in his own name as receiver. J3ank
v. Kennedy, 333.
4. He need not get an order from the comptroller to entitle him to sue, to
collect the assets is his official duty. Id.
5. Bankers have no lien for advances on boxes containing securities deposited with them for safe keeping. Leese v. M£artin, 587.
6. They are gratuitous bailees. Id.
7. Though a bank may be deprived by statute of the right to take real
estate, still it may through a trustee obtain control of real estate on which
it had a lien and sell the same. Zanizingers v. Gantw", 587.
8. A National Bank is not bound to make a formal acceptance of a cashier's bond. Acceptance will be presumed from the presentation to and retention by the bank, and the entry of the cashier on his duties. Graces v. Lebanon Vational Bank, 617.
9. The sureties of a cashier are liable for default made after the execution
of their bond, although the batik may have published accounts of its affhirs,
as required by law, which were untrue and calculated to mislead. Id.
10. The directors of a National Bank published a statement of the condition of the bank, showing apparently a correct and prosperous administration. In fact the cashier had at that time made defaults which a slight degree of care would have discovered. Shortly after the publication of the
statement the cashier filed a bond with sureties. On the subsequent discovery
of the default and suit against the sureties it was held, that the bond was void
as to them, having been based on misrepresentations. Id.
11. Stinble, It will he presumed that a surety under such circumstances,
had read and acted on the published statement. Id.
12. Shares of stock in a national bank are personal property, but the law
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creating them could separate them from the person of their owner, for thi
purpose of taxation, anul give them a situs of their own. Tappan, Collector,
v. Mferchants' ]Vat. Bank, 713.

13. The 41st section of the. National Banking, Act of June 3d 1864, separating the shares, became a law of the property and every state within which
a national bank was located acquired jurisdiction for the purpose of taxation. Id.
14. Nothing in Article IX. of the Constitution of Illinois of 1848. prevented the legislature from taxing the owner of shares in the place where tie
bank was located. Id.
BANKRUPTCY.
I. Jurisdiction.
1. Tire bankrupt court has jurisdiction of a petition by one partner, though
proceedings are pending in a state court to wind up partnership. Ia re
Noonan, 121.
2. Such petition being voluntary need not allege an act of bankruptcy. 7d.
3. A dissolution of partnership does not put an end to the power ot bankrupt court. Id.
4. So long as any unfinished business remains the court has jursiliction. Id.
5. Tile District Court has no jurisdiction of involuntary bankruptcy, unless
it appear- there are over $30 of debts, and bankrupt is indebted to petitioner
over $250. In re Skclleg, 122.
6. When indebtedness is reduced below that sum by subsequent payments,
the court loses jurisdiction. Id.
7. The creditor cannot add the costs to his debt to raise it above the jurisd.
dictional limit.
8. Nor can lie aild cotnsel feeq. Id.
9. MARRIED WOMEN AS BANKRUPTS, 129.
10. A fire insurance company is within the scope of the bankrupt law.
In re Merchants' los. CGo,193.
11. Appointment by a state court of receiver is a "taking on legal process"
within the 39th section of the bankrupt act. Id.
12. The jurisdiction of the Federal Courts is exclusive. Id.
13. The failure to file petition, and acquiiescence in proceedings hy state
court against insolvent insurance company, is an act of bankruptcy. Id.
14. Payment of rent to preserve a valuable lease is an act of bankruptcy. 11.
II. Effect of Proceedings.
15. The purchaser of a note from the payee, after the institution of bankruptcy proceedings against him, takes no title to the note. In re Lake, 193.
16. Proceedings in bankruptcy are notice to all the world. I.
III. Fraudulent Preferences. See CounTs, 3, 4. HOMESTEAD, 7.
17. To render a mortgage void under the 35th section, it is not necessary
that the debtor knew or believed himself insolvent. Hall v. Wager, 120.
18. It is a logical sequence that when an insolvent gives a mortgage to
one creditor lie does it to give him a preference.

Id.

19. Trte Act of 1841 declares void preferences made by a party contentplating bankruptcy, the Act of 1867 includes those, by a party being insolvent. Id.

20. Every act that tends to defeat equal distribution should be construed
strictly again-t an insolvent. Id
21. What constitutes insolvency should be determined by the general custom
of insolvent's place of business. Id.
22. A mortgage given to a creditor who had reasonable cause to believe
the debtor insolvent is a fraud upon the act. Id.
23. The question is, had the creditor "reasonable cause to believe "-not
what he did believe.

Id.

24. When partners are insolvent they hold the partnership effects in trust
for firm creditors and cannot by transfer defeat tht., trust. In re Cook
Gleason, 121.

25. A sale by one partner to his copartner when the firm is insolvent is
presumptively fraudulent. rd.
26. Such transfer is void under the 35th sec. of the Act. Id.
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BANKRUPTCY.
IV. Proofof Debts.
27. A party purchasing claims against a bankrupt in good faith should not
be deprived of participation in the estate. In re Strachan, 120.
28. To enable him to prove he should take an assignment. Id.
29. Such claims should be proven as of date of adjudication. Id.
30. The act should not be construed so as to prevent a debtor from making
every effort to extricate himself. Id.
V. Property Exempt.
31. Insolvent having sold his homestead cannot move his family into his
store and hold that as exempt. In re Wright, 193.
32. He call sell his homestead but cannot shift it to the prejudice of his
creditors. Id.
33. The provision of the Bankruptcy Act adopting the exemption laws of
the several states has been sustained on the ground that it enacted a uniforil
rule that such property should be subject to its operation for the payment of
debts, as was liable to judicial process for the same purpose, in the several
states. In re Deckert, 624.
34. The Amendatory Act of March 3.1 1873, so far as it departs from this
rule and attempts to exempt property specified in the state laws, in a different manner or with different effect from that of the laws themselves, is a violation of the constitutional requirement of uniformity and therefore void. Id.
VI. D;scharye.
35. The recovery of a judgment upon a contract induced by fraud, is not a
debt created by fraud within tile act, and a discharge is a good deflence to an
action upon such judgment. Palmer v. Preston, 51.
36. If bankrupt's assets are 50 per cent. of the debts proved, he is entitled
to his discharge without time assent of his creditors. it re Kahley, 193.
VII. Rights and Duties of Assignee. See COURTS, 1.
37. Assignee may maintain suit to collect assets in any District Court.
Goodall Assignee v. Tulle, 192.
38. Such right though not expressly conferred is implied from grant 11to
collect assets." Id.
39. Congress must have intended to provide for the complete administration
of the bankrupt system, and a. there is no authority given to Circuit Courts
to entertain such suits, it must be in District Courts. Id.
40. Legislature adopting statute of another state is presumed to have
adopted the judicial construction thereof. Id.
41. Covenant in mortgage to keep the premises insured for benefit of mortgagee is valid against assignee in bankruptcy as a lien on insurance-money.
It re Sands Ale Brewing Co., 193.
42. Such covenant runs with the land and is notice to creditors. Id.
BILL OF LADING.
Assignment of bill of lading conveys title to cargo.

Tilden v. Minor, 51.

BILLS AND NOTES.
I. Form. Consideration. See AGREEMENT. CONFEDERATE STATEi-S, 4.
1. In Kentucky, negotiable paper, unless discounted at i hank. passes sullject to all equities existing between the parties. Where it is given fur Il,.
price of land, the vendor executing a deed, with full covenants of warrantv
of title, the land being at the tine encumbered by a -mnorrgauc or vendor's
lien, the purchaser will be eititled, in equity, to set off tile aniount of the
mortgage against his notes, if before th notes become du tile
vendor has
become insolvent. And the vendee, having said to one who had tile
notes
for sale, that they "1were all right," will not preclude him from making
such defenece. Thompson v. Tenley, 99.
2. A note given by a clerk in a post-office to the postmaster for the payment of the amount embezzled by the clerk, is not founded on a consideration
illegal and void as against public policy, though postmaster agreed not to
prosecute if he got the note. Bbb v. Hithcock, 39o.
3. It is no defence to a suit on a note, that defendant told plaintiff when he
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was about to buy, not to do so, that there was a promise when it was made
that it should not be negotiated and he would buy a law-suit. Heist et al. v.
Hart, 452.
4. A parol agreement that payee will not negotiate, and will renew, is
inadmisible to vary the effect of a note. Id.
5. Taking a note on which the endorsements are forged, in renewal of a
previous one, does not extinguish the original note. Ritter v. Singmaster,
521.
6. The record of the notary being proved to contain a true copy of the
original note, was admissible in evidence. Id,
7. The bank discounting the first note was entitled to recover. Id.
8. The receipt by a surety of a note from the principal, after he has paid
his liability, will not extinguish the surety's claim on a note of a third person
which the principal has previously given him as indemnity. Pinney v. Kingston, 647.
9. The defence of, without consideration, should he sustained by evidence
which leaves no reasonable doubt. Punch v. Williams, 647.
10. A paper promising to pay with interest a sum specified and acknowledged to be due "as soon as the crop can be sold or the money raised from
any other source," is neither in form nor effect a promissory note. Nunez v.
Dtiatel, 706.
11. It is a promise to pay upon the occurrence of either of the events, or
after the lapse of a reasonable amount of time. Id.
12. What is a reasonable time is for the court to determine ; five years is
more than a reasonable time. Id.
13. A note, "Twelve months after date [or before if made out of the sale
of a machine]" I promise to pay &c. : is negotiable. Ernst v. Steckman,
706.
14. To be negotiable a note must be payable at a fixed time, and must not
depend upon a contingency. Id.
15. It is negotiable if payable certainly at a fixed time though subject to a
contingency under which it may be due earlier. Id.
II. Endorsement, Acceptance.
16. Ajoint owner of a note cannot be charged as endorsee by his co-owner,
nor by any one except he be a bond fide holder for value, and took it before
maturity. Norton v. Edgar, 5 1.
17. A purchaser from a joint owner who is authorized to sell his co-owner's
interest, takes the whole interest, but whether he can charge .tuch co-owner
as entlorser, depends on the flicts. Id.
18. Ifta joint owner sells, without his co-owner's consent, the purchaser acquires only the seller's interest. 11.
19. Au endorser of an accommodation note is a creditor of the drawer,
within the 4th sect. of Statute of Frauds. Phelps Y. Mlforrison, 52.
20. Though the statutes of Michigan require an acceptance to be in writing
they do not prescribe in what form it shall be. Petersn v. Ifubbard, 452.
21. Anything written by the drawee indicating an intention to accept is
sufficient. Id.
22. An endorsement of a partial payment on an order, made by the party
paying, is an acceptance. Id.
23. A note given by F. to L. to reimburse him for the payment of a bill
of exclnge on which lie was endorser for F.'s benefit, is not illegal because
the hill was paid in Confelderate money. L/lon v. Robertson, 453.
24. The relative rights anil duties of parties who endorse a promissory note
for the accommodation of the maker, are the same as in the case of a business note. A subscquent endorser who pays it, may recover of a prior endorser the wlle amount paid, and not merely a contribution, as in the case
of sureties. Kirsclner v. Conkllln, 471.
25. And it makes no difference that the endorsers both knew that each was
an accommodation endorser, so long as there was no actual agreement between them to share the liability. Id.
26. Nor in the absence of such an agreement, that the object of the eo-
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dorsements was to enable the maker to get a loan at bank upon the note, and
that they were to operate together as a security to the bank. Kirschner v.
Conklin, 471.
27. Where a bank presents bills to the drawers with an accompanying
ticket representing that the bank held bills of lading to cover them. the
drawers will be liable on their acceptance though the bills of lading turn out
forgeries, unless the bank represented them as good. Baxter v. Clirqnao,
587.
III. Notice.
28. A notice of protest delivered to an endorser on Sunday is void, and
does not render him liable on the note. Rhetem v. Carlisle Bank, 499.
29. The mere receipt by the endorser of the notice in a sealed envelope,
even if told what it is, does not, without his saying or doing anything to mislead the notary, amount to a waiver of the irregularity. Id.
30. Nor does the receipt of notice in that way on Sunday amount to a valid
notice to him on Monday, though a new notice to him on that day would
have been in time. Id.
BOOM.

See NAVIGATIOx, 2.

BOND.
A bond-holder who converts his bonds into stock, in accordance with a
provision to that effect, is only entitled to receive stock to the amount of the
principal of his bond, and cannot claim a share of any new stock that has
been issued by the company, to pay its interest to its stockholders. ,Sutliffv.
C. 4- M. Railroad Co., 775.
BOUNDARY. See RIPARIAN OWN.R, 4.
1. An ancient boundary of a municipal jurisdiction may be proved by general reputation. Morgan v. Afagor of Mobile, 52.
2. The location of a boundary is subject to parol evidepce.
d.
3. In order to make monuments govern courses and distances, the location
of the monuments must be proved, if no monuments are mentioned in a deed,
or if mentioned, are not proved ; courses and distances will govern. Bagley
v. Morrill, 708.
4. If land is described as lying north of a toad-bed, while the boundaries include the bed, it will pass by the conveyance. Williams et al. v. Sparks, 776.
BROKER.

CANAL.

See LICENSE, 1.

See CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW, 48.

CAPITAL. See STOCK, 1.
CASES APPROVED, OVERRULED, &c.
Atty. Genl. v. Lothrop, 24 Mich. 235, approved, Park Cons. v. Common
Council, 524.
Bay City v. State Treas., 23 Mich. 503, approved. ParkCoins. v. Common
Council, 524.
Bv. I-,
22 Wis. 372, distinguished. Scheer v. Keown, 590.
Blake v. Brackett, 47 Maine 28. affirmel. Haickelt v. Lone. 123.
Clark v. Campan, 19 Mich. 325, approved. Bay City Gas Co. v. Industrial
Work q, 526.
Dean v. Nelson, 10 Wallace 172, affirmed. Lasere v. Rocheren,, 335.
Dole v. Johnson, 50 N. 11. 452, affirmed. .Elliagwood v. Bragg, 57.
.2Etna Life Ins. Co. v. McCormick, 20 Wis. 565, approved. Srheer v.
Keown, 711.
Folson v. Ins. Co., 18 Wall. 237, affirmed. Cooper v. Omohundro, 654.
Foss v. Edwards, 47 Maine 145, ovcrru td. Rackettv. Lane, 123.
Gilson v. Bingham, 43 Vt. 410, explained. Davenport v. Hubbard, 777.
Higgins v. Whitney, 24 Wend. 379, approved. Dalton v. Landahn, 391.
House v. Foster, in 'Washington Co. Vt. 1852, cited. Johnson v. Muzzy,
55.
Massey v. Seaden, L. Rep. 4 Ex. 13, cited. Wharton v. Kirkwood, 592.
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CASES APPROVED, OVERRULED, &c.
McBride v. Ins. Co., 30 Wis. 562, approved. Smith v. Amazon Ins. Co.,
651.
Otis r. Jones, 21 Wend. 394, approved. Dalton v. Landahn, 391.
People v. Saunders, 25 Mich. 119, cited. Beebe v. Knapp, 458.
People v. Mahany, 13 Mich. 487, approved. Park Corns. v. Common Council,
524.
Rex v. Russel, 6 B. & C. 566. overruled. Atty. Genl. v. Terry, 591.
Roberts v. Fisher, 43 N. Y. 159, approved. Roberts v. Fisher, 262.
The Baltimore, 8 Wall. 373, distinguished. The Falcon, 646.
Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457, affirmed. Knowlesv. Gas Light Co.,
591.
Thornton v. Smith, 8 Wall. 1, explained. The Confederate Note Case, 707.
Wharton v. Kirkwood,
Toms v. Wilson, 7 L. T. Rep. N. S. 421, cited.
592.
CERTIORATI.
1. A certiorari must he directed to all persons whose return is necessary
to enable thie court to determine the regularity of tle proceedings. The
People ex rel. Davis v. Hill, 52.
2. If writ is directed to all the officers or bodies whose action completed
the act complainied of, it is sufficient. Id.
3. When the acts of different officers do not form part of one official act
separate writs must issue. Id.
4. When ministerial acts are complained of the writ should he directed to
the officer acting. Id.
5. A ministerial act cannot be complained of unless connected with a judicial act. 111.
6. If the action of ministerial officer is necessary to give relief, the court
should compel return. Id.
7. A party is entitled to a common-law certlorarito review the determination of a judicial officer or body when there is no other remedy. The People
ex rel. Akin v. Morgan, 122.
8. He must have an interest in the case to entitle him to the writ. Id.
9. On certiorari the court of review is governed by the return alone and
id.
will not consider papers annexed thereto.
10. Though a tax-payer cannot maintain an action to restrain the collection
of a tax, he is entitled to a certiorari to review the proceedings of the assessors. The People ex rel. Akin v. Morgan, 128.
11. Where the assessors have to determine a fact their decision becomes
judicial and reviewable by certiorari. Id.
CHARITABLE USE.

See WILL, 9.

CHECK.
The payee of a check whose name has been endorsed without his authority
may recover from the bank paying it. Seventh NYational Bank v. Cook, 522.
CHURCH.

THE LAW OF RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES AND CHURCH CORPORATIONs, 65.

CITIZEN. See

ALIEN,

CIVIL RIGIITS.

2.

NATURALIZATION.

See COMMON

CARRIER,

11,

12.

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW,

7, 9, 15.

Ali Am't of Congress which says " no person shall be excluded from the car.
or a railroad, on account of color," means that colored persons .ehall travel
in the same cars as white ones. Railroad Co. v. Brown. 326.
COIN.

See COVENANT, 4.

SuIrPING, 9.

COLLATERALS. See BAILMIENT, 1. DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 8, 9.
COMMON CARRIER.
1. Carriers of live-stock are not insurers. For accidents necessarily incident to the live-stock in transportation, they are not liable. Louisville R.
It. Co. v. Hedger, 145.
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2. They are bound nevertheless to extraordinary diligence, such as a prudent
and careful man would exercise in the business of stock transportation. Louisville R. R. Co. v. Hedqer, 145.
3. They cannot discharge themselves from this liability by any contract
with the owner of the live-sE)ck Id.
4. Common carriers may limit their liability as insurers by special agreement : but such agreement cannot be implied from the publication of notices
by the carrier, unless the owner knows of such notices, and expressly assents
to the limitation of liability therein contained.

(Per l'RYO. J.)

Id.

5. The loss or injury of live-stock in the custody or care of the carrier, is
pritud.facie evidence of negligr ,ce. Id.
6. But when the owner tp'.es charge of his stock during transportation,
negligence must be shown , render the carrier liable. 11.
7. Common carriers c passengers have the legal right to make reasonable and proper rules and regulations for the conduct and accommodation of
alt persons who travel by their conveyances. Coger v. N. IV. itueion Packet
Co., 162.

8. The sale of a ticket to a passenger is n contract to carry such passenger
according to their rules and regulaitms. Id.
9. They have no right however to make ruleq &rrgulations for their passengers, based upon any distinction as to race or color. Al.
10. A negro woman who purchases a first-class dinner ticket on a Mississippi steamboat is entitled to sit at the same table as the other passen,_,ers. Id.
11. This is a right secured to her by the laws of the state of Iowa, and
the Constitution of the United States. Id.
12. The object of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, was to relieve citizens of African descent from the effects of the prejudice theretofore existing against them ; and to protect them in person and
property from its spirit. Id.
13. A carrier receiving goods to deliver to a connecting express, becomes
a forwarder as soon as the goods arrive at the end of his route. and his liability as carrier ceases. Inhabitants qf No. 4 Plantation v. ulailet al , 254.
14. In a suit against such forwarder for negligence the burden of proof is
on the plaintiff. Id.
15. Cannot exempt himself from responsibility for negligence of himself
or servants. Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 326.
16. The rule applies to a drover travelling on a free pass, and looking
after his cattle. Id.
CONFEDERATE NOTES.

See BisLS AND NOTES, 23.

1. Where suit is brought to enforce a contract payable "1in dollars" and
made during the war, evidence is admissible to show that Confederate notes
were meant. The Confederate Vote Case, 706.
2. The presumption is that lawful currency of the United States was intended. Id.
3. The understanding of the parties may be shown from the nature of the
transaction, and where the bonds of a railroad were issued, payable in from
seven to thirteen years, lawful money, and not Confederate notes, will be
presumed to have been meant. Id.
4. The interest on a bond is payable in the same currency as the bond. Id.

CONFEDERATE STATES.

See ExEcUTORS

AND

ADMINISTRATORS,

I.

WAR, I.

1. A judgment and sale of mortgaged premises wiibin the lines of the
Federal army. against one who had been expelled into the Confederacy, is
null and must be reverqed. Lasere v. Rorhereau. 334.
2. Judicial proceedings had in Alabama during the war are not void.
Copeland Adinr. v. Winston, 397.
3. The records of the courts in Alabama during the war are provable in the
same manner as those of the present courts. Id.
4. A suit prosecuted to judgment during the war against the maker of
paper not commercial, is a sufficient compliance with the statute, to fix the
liability of the assignor. Id.
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I. Power of Congresi.
1. Military commissions and their acts, during the late war, were uncon
stitutioial in states that were undisturbed. 1llIigan v. Hovej, 122.
2. nhe members of such commissions and U. S. army officers are liable
for arrest and imprisonment. Id.
:3. Ao oir imprisonment beyond their jurisdiction if it was in consequence
of sentence protounced by them. id.
4. An Act of Congress would not be a justification if the trial by corn ni-sion wa- frlhildh.n by the Constitution. Id.
5. The damages shiould be compensatory and not punitive. .d.
6. !'lie limitation imposed by the Act of March 3d 1863 for the bringing of
suits wa within the power of Congress. Id.
7. Where rights of individual citizens are not derived originally from the
Constitution, but are part of the political inheritance from the mother country, the power of Congress does not extend to the enactment of positive laws
for the protection of such rights, but only to the prevention of the states front
violation of them. United States v. Crikshank, 630.
8. But where a right is derived from the Constitution and affirmative legislation is necessary to secure it to the citizen, then Congress may pass positive
laws for the enforcement of the right and for the punishment of individuals
who interfere with it. Id.
9. 'rhiese principles apply to the 14th Amendment cqually with the rest
of the Constiturion, and there can be no constitutional legislation under that
amenment for directly enforcing the privileges and immunities of citizens
of the United States by original proceedings in the Federal courts, where the
only constitutional guaranty of such privileges is that no state shall pass any
law to abridge them, and where the state has in fact passed no such laws. Id.
10. The 13th Amendment gave Congress power to pass positive laws for
doing away with slavery, but it did not give power to pass laws for the punishment of ordinary crimes against the colored race any more than against
any uther race. That power remains to the states. Id.
11. To constitute an offence of which Congress and the Federal courts can
take eognisance under this amendment, there must be a des:gn to injure a person or deprive him of his right, by reason of his race, color or previous condition of servitude. Id.
12. The 15th Amendment confers no right to vote. That is '. exclusive
prerogative of the states. It does confer a right not to be excluded from voting liy reason of race, color or previous condition of servitude, an ' his is
all the right that Congress can enforce. Id.
13. Siuble, Congress may pass laws to protect this right under the 15th
Ameniment from individual violation, although the laws of the state are not
reputnatt to the amendment. Id.
14. But offences against the right to vote are not cognisable under the
power of Congress, unless they have as a motive the race, color or previous
condition of servitude of the party whose right is assailed. Id.
15. The woar of race, whether it assumes the dimensions of civil strife and
domestic violence, or is limited to private outrage, is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, but outrage or violence, whether against colored people or white people, which lacks this motive and springs from the
ordinary impulse of crime, is within the sole Jurisdiction of the individual
siate, unless the latter by its lays denies to any race the full equality of protectiot.
Id.
16. An indictment for conspiracy to interfere with the right peaceably to
asseitble, &c., or with the right to bear arms, or ( to deprive certain citizens of African descent of their lives and liberties without due process of
law," where the state has not passed any law interferiig with such rights or
denying equal protection to all its citizens, is not sustainable in a United
States court under any law that Congress had power to pass. Id.
17. An indictment for conspiracy to deprive certain citizens of African descent of the free exercise and enjoyment of the right to the full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property
which is enjoyed by white citizens, does not in the absence of a specific alli-
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gation of a design to deprive the injured persons of their rights on account of
their race, color or previous condition of servitude, charge any offence cognisable in a United States court. United States v. (jruLksha,]k, 630.
18. Semble, such an indictment is also bad for vagueness. Id.
19. The Act of Congress of May 31st 1870, commonly called the Enforcement Act, so far as it assumes to regulate the right to vote, is beyond the
scope of the 15th Amendment and void. And an indictment under it for conspiracy to hinder certain citizens of African descent in the exercise of their
right to vote, cannot he sustained in a United States court without an allegaition that the conspiracy was to hinder, &c., by reason of their race, color or
previous condition of servitude. Id.
Il. Power of Legislature. See PILOTAGE, 4.
20. The usual and ordinary legislation of the states regulating or prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors raises no question under the Constitution
of the United States prior to the fourteenth amendment of that instrument.
Bartemeyer v. State of Iowa, 220.
21. The right to sell intoxicating liquors is not one of the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States which by that amendment the states
were forbidden to abridge. Id.
22. But if a case were presented in which a person owning liquor or other
property at the time a law was passed by the statw absolutely prohibiting any
sale of it, it would be a very grave question whether such a law would not be
inconsistent with the provision of that amendment which forbids the state to
deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due course of law.
.d.
23. While the case before us attempts to present that question, it fails to
do it, because the plea, which is taken as true, does not state, in due form and
by positive allegation, the time when the defendant became the owner of the
liquor sold: and secondly, because the record satisfies us that this is a moot
case, made up to obtain the opinion of this court on a grave constitutional
question, without the existence of the facts necessary to raise that question.
Id.
24. In such a case, where the Supreme Court of the state to which the writ
of error is directed has not considerel the question, this court does not feel
at liberty to go out of its usual course to decide it. Id.
25. After a tax and the penalties which have accrued from its non-payment, have been repealed by statute, the tax may be reimposed but the penalties cannot. Dixon v. The Mayor of Jersey City, 390.
26. Penalties may be imposed for future delinquencies, as a means of
collecting a tax, but to impose them for past omissions would be confiscation
and not taxation. .d.
27. The Legislature cannot leave it to a board of commissioners to determine in what proportion the expense of opening a public avenue shall be
imposed on the wards of a city. Gaines v. Hud.son County Corn's 390.
28. The act of taxation must distribute the burden. .d.
29. A landowner who is injured by the laying out of an avenue need not
wait until his property is actually appropriated before seeking redress. Id.
30. A court cannot pronounce a tax unconstitutional on the mere ground
of injustice and inequality. Weber v. Reinhard, 522.
31. Where a municipal corporation purchased the franchises of a water
company, one of which authorized it " to lay assessments on every dwelling
in a street, where pipes are laid and collect the same," though it may have
been unconstitutional for the company, it is not for the corporation. Allentown v. Henry, 522.
32. Such assessment is a local tax for a local benefit. Id.
33. An Act of Assembly must violate some prohibition of the State or Federal Constitution belbre it can be declared unconstitutional. Butler'sAppeal,
522.
34. The legislative power of taxation may be delegated to a municipal corporation. Id.
35. Classes of property as well as classes of persons may be exempted. rd.
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36. An act authorizing the people of a town to decide whether they will
subcribe its bonds in aid of a railroad is not in violation of the Constitution
of New York and is binding. Town of Queensbirq v. Calver, 652.
37. A state cannot impose a tonnage tax on vessels owned in foreign ports.
Peete v. Morgan, 707.
38. The legislature of a state may vacate the office of a professor in one
of its Universities, and appoint another, though such professor had been appointed under the authority of the state, for six years. Head v. The Uairersity. 707.

39. The power to regulate commerce between the states, was vested in
Congress to secure equality in commercial intercourse, and not to interfere
with private contracts. Railroad Co. v. Richmond et al., 707.
40. The building of a bridge across the Mississippi at Dubuque under the Act
of July 25th 1866, did not invalidate a contract previously made by a railroad,
giving an elevator company the right to handle all grain brought to the river.
Id.
41. Contracts valid when maide continue valid notwithstanding a change in
the business which led to their creation. Id.
III. Tak;ng Private Property. See COURTS, 7.
42. The proceedings to determine the necessity for taking private property
for public use, under the Constitution of Wisconsin, are adverse, and no final
step is valid, if taken without notice to the property-owner. Sefert v. Brooks,
712.
43. A village charter which attempts to regulate such proceedings, but
makes no provision for notifying the owner of the time and place of assembling of the jury, is unconstitutional. Id.
44. Where the act is void for failing to provide for notice, the fact that the
property owner was present, but without taking any part, will not give the
proceedings validity. Id.
IV. Eminent Domain.
45. The right of eminent domain is inherent in the government. The
lVaterworks v. Burkhart, 254.
46. It is not confined, but limited by the Constitution, and the limit is not
upon the amount taken, but only requires compensation. Id.
47. Where the state has taken a fee simple and compensated the owner no
abandonment of the use will reinvest the title in the owner, but it is otherwise if only an easement is taken. Id.
48. Where the state has taken a fee simple in lands for its canals the former
owner cannot take ice from the canal. Id.
V. Obligation of Contracts. See INSOLVENT, 2.
49. It is settled law that charters of corporations, other than municipal, although the objects of the corporation may be quasi public, are contracts within the protection of the Federal Constitution. P.
. 4- B. Railroad Co. v.
Bower, 174.
50. Any act having the effect to abridge or restrict any power or privilege
vested by the charter, which is material to the beneficial exerc-e of the franchise granted, and which must be supposed to have entered into the consideration for the acceptance of the charter by the corporators, is an impairing of
the obligation of the contract within the prohibition of the Contitution. Id.
51. An act prohibiting a railroad company from charging at a greater rate
per mile for carriage of passengers or freight from place to place within a state,
than for similar carriage through or beyond the state, no such power to regulate charges having been reserved in the charter, is unconstitutional and void.
Id.
52. Such an act is not within the police powcr of the state. The legislature
may regulate the exercise of the corporate franchise by general laws passed in
good faith. Id.
53. Whilst a state, in the exercise of its undoubted power to prescribe
forms of action and modes of procedure, may alter and modify the remedy
as it existed at the time a contract was made, yet it is under a duty imposed
by that clause of the Federal Constitution which prohibits the states from
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passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts, if it interfere at all, to
leave in existence a remedy as efficient and substantial as that which subsisted
when the contract was made : For the remedy being necessarily inseparable
from the obligation, any law which clogs it with conditions and restrictions
which materially impair its efficiency, and which did not exist when the contract was made, impairs necessarily the obligation. Lasley v. Phipp., 236.
54. The right to seize and sell by judicial process a debtor's property in
satistaction of a judgment against him, is a material part of the remedy for
the enforcement of the contract on which the judgment is founded; and any
law of a state which materially increases the amount of property exempt by
law from execution over the amount allowed when the contract was made, impairs the remedy materially, and is therefore prohibited by the Federal Constitution. Id.
55. The exemption law of Mississippi passed in 1865 which increased the
homestead exemption from 160 acres of land, not exceeding $1500 in value,
to 240 acres regardless of its value, is, when applied to debts created before
its passage, in violation of that clause of the Federal Constitution which prohibits states from passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts. Id.
CONTEMPT. See ATTORNEY, 3, 4, 5, 6. RECEIVER, 3.
1. A party will not be adjudged in contempt for any act before service of
process alleged to have been disregarded.
WVitter v. Lyon et al., 774.
2. A rule to show cause why party should not be punished for contempt
may be obtained on ex parte affidavits, and may be discharged on same evidence. Id.
3. Rule may be discharged where party shows impossibility of compliance
with order of court. Id.
CONTRACT. See CONSTITUTIOsAL LAW, 41, 49.
1. A contract may be broken before the time for its performance arrives, by
a party to it repudiating it obligation and declaring
that he will not perform
what he has bound himself to do. Hancock v. Y . Y. Life Ins. Co., 103.
2. The obligation of a contract is the legal duty of performing it according
to its terms. Lri.ley v. Phipps, 236.
3. There can be no legal duty without a remedy or means of enforcing it;
for without such remedy a contract is a mere imperfect obligation, depending
for its performance upon the will of him from whom performance is expected.
Parties therefore, who enter into contracts, must be considered as looking to
the municipal law for a remedy to secure performance, ant this law thus
enters into and forms a part of the obligation. Id.
4. A contract to sell may be rescinded before acceptance unlest there is an
agreement on good consideration to the contrary. Stitt v. Huidekoper, 327.
5. Is not to be governed by what either party understood unless such understanding was induced by the conduct of the other party. Kennedy 4- Dailey
v. Railroad Co., 327.
6. A contract giving certain individuals the exclusive right to transport
certain freight over a railroad, is void from considerations of public policy.
Union Locomotie Express Co. v. Erie Railway, 390.
7. A contract in violation of the public policy of a state will not be enforced though it has been recognised by the courts of another state. Id.
8. An offer of compromise is not binding unless accepted. Id.
9. The consideration for an accepted compromise is the release of the
original contract. Id.
10. The Act of June 1862 requiring contracts for military supplies to be
in writing, is not infringed by the proper officer accepting them after the
stipulated time, nor is his verbal agreement to extend the time invalid. Solomon v. United States, 588.
11. If the government receives them there is an implied contract to pay
their value. Id.
12. A party may recover damages for refusal by defendant to allow him to
complete a contract, for building a house, where he alleges willingness on
his part to go on. Black v. Woodrow 4- Richardson, 774.
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13. One who has entered into a contract under a bond fide mistake of facts
may rescind, if third parties will not be prejudiced. Johnson v. Parker, 776.
14. This is not the case when several creditors have compromised their
debtor's claims, relying on the mutual agreement of one another. Id.
15. In such case there is a conclusive presumption of law, that setting aside
the settlement as to one, would be injurious: to the others. Id.
16. It is not necessary that a formal promise shoyld have been made, to
entitle creditors to the protection of this rule. Id.
CONVEIlSION.
1. A naked power of sale in executors works no conversion of the land
into personalty, and until sale the title is in the heirs and the husband of one
of them iq entitled to curteqy. Romaine v. Hendrickson'sEx'rs., 328.
2. Such tenant by the curtesy and the son of the deceased (laughter are
proper parties to a bill against executors, to set aside a sale on the ground of
fraud. Id.
CORPORATION. See CONSTITUTIONAi. LAW 1 49.
1. With reference to their power to take and hold real estate corporations
may be classified as follows :1st. Thosc whose charter forbids them to hold.
2d. "'IThose whose charter is silent, may hold if their object cannot otherwise be accomplished.
3d. Those whose charter authorizes them to hold for some purposes.
4th. Those whose charter confers upon them a general power to acquire and
hold it.

Hay ward v. Dvidsoa, 254.

2. Counties are quasi corporations and fall within the third class above
given. Id.
3. Whether real estate has been acquired by a corporation for an authorized use, can only he inquired into by the state. Id.
4. Grants of new and extraordinary powers to a private corporation must
be construed strictly. Township of Greenwich v. Easton 4- Amboyj R. R., 330.
5. In the management of the property, business or affairs of a corporation
by the president or directors thereof, they occupy a relation to the stockholders similar to that of trustees to cestuis que trust. Commissioners v. Reynolds,
376.
6. Upon a former trial between the same parties the counsel for the defendants, a corporation, had admitted their incorporation and that certain persons
were officers of the company at a certain time, and the plaintiff had therefore introduced no proof upon these points. A second trial was had, previous to which the defendants gave the plaintiff notice that they withdrew their
admission of the former trial. Upon the second trial the plaintiff, having
given notice to the defendants to produce the records of* the corporation in
court, which they neglected to do, offered in evidence the admission of their
counsel upon the former trial. J1 ld, 1. That the admission did not hind
the defendants in such a way as to cstop them from denying on the second
trial the facts admitted on the first. 2. But that the admission was admissible
in evidence, with all the circumstances in which it was made, as tending to
prove the facts admitted. Perry v. 11'ater-pronfAfanaft. Co., 430.
7. Has no concern in nor control over the, business of its members not invested in its own funds. Mason v. I-ruele et a/., 454.
8. The legislature could not compel a society to be incorporated without its
assent. Id.
9. Only unanimous consent can bind any member of an unincorporated
company. id.
10. Even absolute identity in the membership of a society and of acorporation would not merge the society in the corporation. Id.
11. The burden of proving a merger is on those seeking to establish it. Id.
COSTS.
/
1. Objection to taxation of costs must in all cases be first made before the
taxing officer.

Hawkins et al. v. Northwestern R. Co., 647.

2. On granting continuance it is within the discretion of the Circuit Court
to require as a condition, the payment of a gross sum as costs. Id.
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1. An action by an assignee to set aside a conveyance as a fraud on the
Bankrupt Act, cannot be entertained by a state court. Gilbert v. Priest, 62.
2. State courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the United States court,
of only such actions as arise incidentally from Acts of Congress /d.
3. 'khe acts for which a state court may set aside a conveyance are such as
are malurn in se. Id.
4. If a conveyance is fraudulent against creditors, the courts of New
York have jurisdiction to declare it void.
.
5. When the political authorities of a state have actually claimed and exercised jurisdiction over a particular locality, the courts of"the state are therebiconcluded, and will respect such decision, and act accordingly, without questioning the validity of such claim. State v. Maqner, 106.
6. The prisoner was not wronged by the instructions given in this case that
proof that the crime was committed on the island called Smutty Nose, is
equivalent to proof that it was committed within the county of York, and
would make the crime properly cognisable by the court sitting in that county.
That instruction was correct. Id.
7. A proceeding to condemn property under an Act of Congress is a "suit
of a civil nature at common law or in equity," within the meaning of the
Judiciary Act. United States v. Block, 124.
8. The construction of that clause cannot be limited to such suits as were
known at the time of its passage, the grant is prospective. Id.
9. The clause was used in contradistinction to admiralty and criminal cases.
Id.
10. Congress has power to authorize Federal courts to condemn property.
Id.
1i.Proceedings instituted by the Secretary of the Treasury are on the part
of the United States. Id.
12. An action cannot be removed from a state court into the Circuit Court
of the United States under the Act of Congress of 1867, c. 196, after a trial
on the merits, although such trial has resulted in a disagreement of the jury.
Galpia v. Critchlow, 139.
13. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction by writ of error over judgment of
state court, where the writ is to highest court in which a decision could be
had, even though it be an inferior court of the state. Miller v. .iuseh, 335.
14. In the con.truction of the statutes of a state, the Supreme Court fidllows
the decisions of the state courts, whatever may be their opinion. Wadker v.
State Harbor Con's., 335.
15. An action in the state courts may he removed into the courts of the
United States, under the Act of Congress of 1867, c. 196, ut any time before
the final trial insuch action - antia trial belore the jury and fidlure to agree
upon a verdict, is not to be regarded as such a final trial. Clurk v. .Railway
Co., 421.
16. Where a case is submitted in the Circuit Court without a jury, under
the Act of Congress of March 3,11865, the Supreme Court will not review
the finding, if it i general. Cooper, Executor, v. Omohundro, 654.
17. A mere report of the evidence is not such a special finding as will authorize the Supreme Court to pass upon the judgment of the Circuit Court.
Crews v. Brewer, 655.
18. It is not competent for the Circuit Court to determine an issue of fact,
without an agreement to waive a trial by jury. Morgan's Executor v. Gag,
655.

19. The Act of March 2d 1867, for removal of cases from state to a Federal
court, only authorizes such removal before final judgment. Stevenson v. Milliams, 715.
20. Where the state court goes on to adjudicate the case after removal, it is
a usurpation, and resi tance by the party against whom judgment is rendered,.
is no waiver of his ri.-ht
to contest the jurisdiction of the state court. Insurance Co. v. Dunn, 716.
21. The language, "any time before the final hearing or trial," in the Actr
VOL. XXII.-52
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of 1867, is not of the same import, as "at any time before the trial or finai
hearing," in the Act of July 27th 1866. Insurance Co. v. Dunn, 716.
COVENANT. See BANKRUPTCY, 41.
1. Equity will enforce a covenant made with a vendee, that in case of subsequent conveyances by the vendor the purchasers shall be restricted in building, though there is no privitv between the parties and such covenant creates
no casement.

Kirkpatriclc v. Pe.hire, 54.

2. Nor will it refuse to restrain a violation of the agreement because the inconvenience is only slight. Id.
3. Covenant for rent will not lie against lessee where lease is by deed-poll,
signed only b~ylessor. Johnson v. Afuzzy, .55.
4. A covenant in a lease to pay the yearly rent of six pence sterling per
acre. in current money of the state of New York equal in value to money of
Great Britain, does not bind the lessee expressly to pay in gold or silver.
Stranuglun v. Youmans, 255.

5. Under such a covenant the lessor is bound to accept the notes of the
United State,, but the lessee must pay enough to make the number of dollars
paid, equal in value to the same number in money of Great Britain. Id.
6. The rent may be paid dollar for dollar in gold and silver coin of the
United States. Id.
7. A covenant that grantee, his heirs and assigns, shall maintain a fence on
line between his land and grantor's, will not, when the land is subdivided, run
with lots that do not abut on the line. W14sh v. Barton, 647.
8. Where one having no title to land conveys it with covenant of warranty
and subsequently acquires title it enures to lhis grantee. Cross v. Afartin, 775.
9. Parties in successive deeds of a chain of title of the same name are
presumptively the same persons. Id.
10. Deed from G. of H. to G. Jr. of H. is presumed from father to son.
Id.
CRIMINAL LAW.
I. General.
I. Where an indictment is founded upon a statute containing provisos and
exceptions, it is unnecessary to allege that the party indicted is not witlin
the exceptions, or to negative the provisos. State v. Cassady, 55.
2. Fal-e explanations, made by an accused person, of suspicious facts,
WVllker v. State, 454.
are proper to be submitted to the jury.
3. The refusal of the court, in a criminal case, to charge that the evidence
must satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt of every fiact necessary to
-constitute the offence, is error. Id.
4. An examination before a magistrate on a criminal charge is not invalidated by a continuance to the 22d of February, and after taking testimony
on that day being continued to the 23d, although by law the 22d was dies
nao juridkcus, and assimilated to Sunday. Hamilton v. The People, 679.
5. Where counts in a criminal information are misjoined, the court is not
bound to quash the information on motion, if the counts relate to one transaction, And the court can regulate the evidence by confining it to that transaction and preventing the surprise or confusion of the defendant. Id.
6. The phrase, the jury in criminal cases are judges of the law as well as
the facts, is trite so far as that the jury must render a general verdict on their
consciences as to the legal and actual guilt of the accused, and cannot be compelled to separate tle law and the facts. But the duty of the jury is the same
in kind in criminal as in civil cases, and the fact that an acquittal whether
right or wrong is not reviewable, does not lessen the duty of the jury to ohey
the law as laid down by the judge, without regard to their personal opinions
as to what thelaw is or ought to be. Id.
7. The discharge of the jury without the consent of the defendant in a
-criminal cause, is equivalent to a verdict of acquittal. Hines v. State, 775.
8. One who participating in the felonious intent, is present aiding or abetWarden v. State, 776.
ting a murder or other felony, is a principal.
9. The actual or constructive presence of the accused is not necessary to
constitute the offence of Riding or abetting under the 36th sect. of the Crimes
Act of Ohio. Id.
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II. Afurder. See ERROR AND APPEAL, 2.
10. All parts of the state are included within the body of one or another
of the several counties into which the state is divided. Statev. Maqner, 106.
I1.When murder has been done in an unincorporated place, publicly and
commonly known by name, in any one of these counties the venue is well laid,
and the place sufficiently described, if the crime be charged in the indictment
as having been committed at (insert the name by which the place is commonly known) a place within the county of (name of county) aforesaid, in
the absence of anything tending to show that the prisoner would be emuhar.
rassed in the preparation of the defence for want of a more particular description. Id.
12. When there is no controversy as to the precise spot on the face of
the earth where the crime was committed, and it appears by ancient charters, legislative enactments and judicial records that the political authorities of
the state and county have heretofore claimed and exercised jurisdiction over
the locality in question, the question of jurisdiction is one of law for the
court, and the defendant cannot in any stage or form of pleading rightfully
claim to have it submitted to the jury as one of fact, for their determination.
ld.
13. Upon such a question the presiding judge in addition to the matters
of which he will take judicial notice, such as legislative enactments, ancient
charters, and geographical position, may refresh his recollection and guide
his judgment by reference to the records of the courts in the county where he
sits, general histories of deceased authors of established reputation, and the
records of the census of the inhabitants of the county taken under the laws of
the United States by its officers. Id.
III. Burglary.
14. On an indictment framed under ?.
3695 of the Revised Code of Alabama,
a count which charges that the defendants "broke into and entered".a certain described building of the class included in that section, "and feloniously
took and carried away " certain enumerated articles of personal property of a
specified third person, is a count for grand larceny only. To constitute a
good count for burglary there must be an averment that the breaking and
entry were " with intent to steal or to commit a felony." Bell v. The State,
752.
15. A count charging that the defendants "broke into and entered " a
certain building therein described, of the class included in .3695 of the Revised Code, " with the intent to steal," charges burglary only. There can
be no conviction of grand larceny under such a count. d.
16. Under a count charging that the defendants 1 broke into and entered a
building which it describes, of the class included in .3695 of the Revised
Code, "with the intent to steal, and feloniously took and carried away"
certain enumerated articles of personal property of a specified third person,
"of the value of more than one hundred dollars," there may be a conviction of either or both of the offences charged. id.
17. Burglary and grand larceny being under the provisions or the Revised
Code, distinct felonies of the same grade and subject to the same nature of
punishment, are not governed by the doctrine of merger. Id.
11q.
When there is a conviction of both burglary and larceny, charged in
the same count, hut one punishment should be awarded.
rI.
19. A verdict finding the defendants guilty of burglary on the trial of an
indictment, chargint, in separate counts both burglary and grand larceny, is
tantamount to an acquittal of the grand larceny, and thereafter expunges that
charge from the indictment. Id.
20. An acquittal thus obtained is final, and cannot be impaired by a judgment rendered by an appellate court, on defendants' appeal, reversing the
conviction for burglary and remanding the cause for further proceedings. Id.
21. An acquittal of grand larceny, resulting from proceedings on the first
trial, being final, takes away any legal foundation for a verdict on the second trial, finding the defendants guilty of grand larceny. Such a verdict i
a nullity. .d.
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22. The rendition by the jury of a void verdict is no legal ground for discharging them from their deliberations. The discharge of a jury, without tile
consent of the defendants, for no other reason than the rendition of A void
verdict, is tantamount to an acquittal of all the charges upon which the jury
were prevented from passing by their dischnre. Bell v. The Stute, 752.
23. The defendants in the case at bar having, been acquitcd of grand larceny on the first trial, and tile court having discharged the jury on the second
triad, witlut the consent of defenalants, fbr no other legal reason than tle
renditio of n void verdict, whereby the jury were prevented frot passing on
the charge of burglary, the only one remaining in tile indictment, it was hell
that tlae whole eae was thereby ended, and the court below having refused
to discharge the defendants, tile Supreme Court on their appeal, reversed tile
judgment and sentence of the court below, and ordered their discharge.
11d.
CURTESY.
CUSTOM.

See HUSBAND AND WIFE, II.
See PARTNERSHIIP,

.

1. Where a contract to ship goods at a certain rate per lb. or at the current
rates of the (lay, alid not specify in what the rates were to he computed, evidence of a custom to compute them in gold is admissible.
Afackenzie v.
Sclamidt, 448.
2. Custom may ao he given in evidence to show that certain sums for primage or average were to be added to the rates expressed. ]d.
3. Such custom being provable in an action on the contract there is no
ground for the jurisdiction of a court of equity. id.
DAM.

See EASEMENT, 1.

See CONSTI'rrTiONAL LAW, 5; CONTRACT, 12; EQUITY, 6; EsTOPPEL, 8; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 43; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 33;
TREsPAss, 9; VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 3.

DAMAGES.

1. A negro apprentice cannot recover damages from his master, for enlisting him as a substitute For his son, who had been drafted.
Gent v. Cole, 256.
2. Evidence of the price of substitutes is not admissible, as furnishing any
criterion for assessing damages. Id.
3. Where a breach of contract has been compromised, the only damages
that can he recovered are the terms of the compromise.
Uaion Loconotive
Co. v. Erie Railway, 391.
4. An agreement in the sale of property that in case of default any payments made shall be retained, will not be enforced by the law as stipulated
damages. Johnston v. Wlaitteaore, 391.
5. Where property is tortiously taken the owner is entitled to full compensation in damages. Daltoa v. Landahn,!391.
6. A subsequent sale to the trespasser oat legal process cannot be shown toreduce the damages. Id.
7. It is different if the sale is to some other one than the trespasser. id.
8. No general rule can do exact justice in all cases of failure to deliver
property to the vendee. Chadwick v. Butlers, 455.
9. The vendee is entitled to the value of the goods at the time they shoul
have been delivered. Id.
10. It is error to allow evidence of the highest market price between the
time of sale and bringing suit. Id.
11. The measure of damages where vendor fails to comply with his contract
is difference between the contract and market price at time of breach. AteHose v.

ulmer, 523.

12. When the article cannot be obtained, the measure is the actual loss
vendee sustains.
d.
13. On refusal of vendee to accept goods sold him, the damages are difference between contract and market price at time of refusal. Laubach v. Laubach, 523.
14. Where contract is that vendee may rescind, damages are price paid and
interest. Id.
15. A contractor for transportation cannot recover damages for the loss of
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profits by failure of the United States to furnish the amount of freights they
gave him notice they would require. Buckley v. United States, 588.
16. He is entitled to recover for his extra expense. Id.
17. Prospective damages arising from loss of time, doctoring, &c., if reduced
to their present worth, may be given for personal injuries. Fulsome v. Town
of Concord, 714.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See ACrioN, 5, 6. STOCK, I.
I. Generally.
1. To entitle a poor debtor to chancery of his bond the justices must be
selected according to law and have jurisdiction over his disclosure. Hackett
v. Lane, 123.
2. The only bars to an action on the bond, are payment of debt, surrender
of debtor, or disclosure. Id.
3. Pleas of performance estop debtor from claiming, that in consequence
of non-conformity to statute, bond is only good at common law. Id.
4. A poor debtor's bond, not according to statute in its approval, is good
only at common law. Smith v. Brown, 123.
5. No apprisal of demands disclosed under such bond is necessary unless
required by the terms of the bond. Id.
6. The record of the justices hearing such disclosure is sufficient of itself.
Id.
7. Where creditor takes the drafts of a third person, hut not in payment,
they cannot affect his rights so long as they remain unpaid. Allen v. Clark,
194.
8. They are to be deemed simply as collaterals and may be prosecuted to
judgment without prejudicing creditor's claim against principal debtor. Id.
9. A creditor taking a chose in action as collateral security for a pre-existing indebtedness is not a purchaser for value. Ashton's Appeal, 395.
Ir. Sale or Conveyance Fraudulent as to Creditors. See HUSBAND AND WIFE,
31.
10. A voluntary conveyance by a debtor to the wife is void as against an
antecedent creditor. Phelps v. Morrison, 56.
1t. A purchaser under a void deed, for valuable consideration and without
notice, will be protected against an antecedent creditor to amount of purchasemoney. Id.
12. Asale of furniture by the vendor, who occupies the same house as the
vendee, with no transfer other than a bill of sale, is void as against his creditors, under the Statute of Frauds of Missouri. Allen v. Massey, 329.
13. When the gift of land by a father to his daughter is assailed for fraud,
and his creditors are all judgment creditors subsequent to the gift, the fraud
is one of fact, and cannot be determined by the court. Hendon v. White, 455.
14. Such gift is not necessarily void against existing creditors. Id.
15. The retention of possession of stock sold to a creditor, though a badge
of fraud, is susceptible of being overcome by proof that debtor acted as agent
of vendee. Afoug v. Benedict, 455.
DECEDENTS' ESTATE. See INSURANCE, 31.
1. Unharvested crops go to the devisee of the land and not to the executor.
As against the heirs at law they go to the executor ; but as against a devisee
they do not, unless it appear by the will that the testator so intended. Dennett v. Hopkinson, 359.
2. Hay in a barn passes under a bequest of "all the household furniture
and other articles of personal property in and about the buildings." Id.
DEED.
1. A deed should be attested by witnesses or acknowledged by the maker,
to make it complete. Hendon v. hte, 456.
2. A subsequent acknowledgment has the effect of a ratification and relates
back to the date of delivery. Id.
3. A deed purporting to have been executed by the president of a railroad
as authorized by the Act of 1852 of Ohio, if objected to, cannot be given in
evidence without proof of execution. Walsh v. Burton, 654.
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DIVIDEND. See IUsBtAND ANtD WlF, , 37, 38. TAXATION, 5, 7.
Dividends belong to tile persoui owning the stock at the time they are actulily declared.
]lruudoye v lrumhtye, 124.
DIVORCE.
)OCK.

See

usBAND AND WIFE, I.

See RIPAILIAN OWNEt, 8, 9.

DOMICIL.
I. To constitute a change, there mu~t he intention to make, and the fact of
making. P',arsous v. lhiunr, 256.
2. Tihe acts and intitions of tile wife do pot affect tile domicil of the Ibesband. Id.
DOWEIR.

See IIUSBAND AND WIFE, II.

EASEMENT.
I Merely maintaining a dam for twenty years, does not give a prescriptive
right to flow land as high as it can be flowed by that dai ; to acquire such
right it mut have been dlone with sufficient equency (huring tile twentyv years
Gil/',rd V.
to have given landowner notice thati tile right was being claiied.
lVindpiseoqee Lake, 56.
2. Where a i-vitti-le i. continiotlu and apparent n purchaser at a private or
judicial saile takes subject to it. (Omnon Y. B3od. 456.
3. It tnake-; no difference whether reference is made to the servitude in the
deed of the dominant tenement or not. Id.
4. Nor JIM's tile expectation of tle agent who purchases the dominant tenement, altect the principal's title. Ii.
EJECTMENT. See FnAun, 5.
1. 'laintiff in cjectinent is only required to show that the title atd right of
possession was in him at the conaieaicieitofthi action. McLale v. Bfveg, 648.
2. Unler general denial, defendant Cannot show that lie has acquired title
d.
since tite commencement of action.
3. A julgment for plaintif does not bar a subsrqueat action by defendant to
assert his title so acquired. Id.
4. The person named in a certificate of entry of land at a United States
land office has "a valid subsisting interest" ani may maintain ejectment
therelor. Id.
5. It is only a determinable fee at most, tite certificate may be cancelled,
and tile title tis revests in the United States. Id.
ELECTION. See WtLL, 2, 5.
1. Tite principles of public policy which make void tll contracts tending
to the corrupting of elections ield under authority of law, apply equally to
what are called primary or nominating elections, although these are mere
voluintary proceedings of the voters of certain political parties. Strasburger
v. urk, 607.
2. A Contract to procure a nomination for a public office by providing
liquors, &c., to voters, is void, and the courts will not aid either party in its
enforcement. Id.
ENEMY.

See WAt, 1, 2.

See COVENANT, I. HOMESTEAD, 1. HUSnAND AND WIFE, 30.
TAXATION, 1, 2. VExtbOR ANt) PURCIASER, 11.
1. Chancery will not entertain lill to itmpeach a judgment at 1 iw for mere
T. of 1lJ'rdsbnrov. Ilhitinlionm, 57.
irregularity.
2. Nor to try tile truth of an officer's return by parol testimony. Id.
3. Will refoim a deed made by mistake or Iath parties, anil protect by
decree tile interests of parties boliing tnder it. Burr v. Hutchiinson, 257.
4. Will nit aid a creditor to reach hi debtor's property, unless the debt is
clear, and there exists some special grounds for tile interposition of the court.
Board of Public Works v. Columbia Colleqe, 327.
5. If a change in the amount of damage done to land taken by a railroad,
occurs after the report of the commissioners, equity will relieve, as there is no
remedy at law. Carpenter v. Eu.ton 4- Aibo/1 R. R., 328.

EQUITY.

INDEX.
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6. The Court of Chancerv has power in such case to determine the amount
of compensation. Carpenter v. Easton 4- Amboy R. R., 328.
7. Court. of equity have authority to revive suits on death of the parties
independent of enactments governing the law courts. Ex parle Kirtund, 451.
8. In a suit at law to administer equity thejudge sits as chancellor and he
mut he satisfied as to sufficiency of evidence. Fast v. fiaqs., 456.
9. If evidence be vague, uncertain or douhtful lie must withdraw it from the
jury. rd.
10. Will not reqtrain proceedingn in another equitable suit. in tile same
court. Dayton v. Relf. 777.
11. The action to foreclose tax title under ch. 22 of Wisconsin Lawe, i.4
equitable, and if owner is entitled under ch. 89 to five years to redeem, lie
must set it up in defence in same action. Id.
ERROR AND APPEAL. See ADMIRALTY, 7. 8. ARBITrATioN, 4. CatiMiRECBIvER, 5.
NAL- LAW, 3. DAMAGES, 10. INSURANCE, 13. PLE1,IING, 5.
1. Where the jury decide a reet erroneously it must lie corrected hv appeal,
and cannot he reviewed in a second suit between the same parties. Mrcellns
v. Canntr~linan, 58.
2. A charge that, if defendant " in the heat of blood anI upon sufficient
provocation," threw deceased down stairs, the offence was mantlan,,hter, is
not erroneous, where suhequent instructions showed, '1 sufficient" was used
as equivalent to "great and sudden." State v. Mfurply, 123.
3. An appeal lies to an order refusing to strike an amended complaint
from the files. Supervisors of Kewaunee Co. v. Decker, 647.
4. It is error to refuse to charge "that the jury are not to allow any feeling
of sympathy for the plaintiff to influence thu verdict." Fulsome v. Town of
Concord, 714.
ESTATES.
A settlement in trust for one, without words of limitation, and if lie should
die without issue, then over, passes only a life estate, notwithstanding a subsequent will by the settlor confirming the settlement. Middleton v. Barker,
589.
ESTOPPEL. See HIGHWAY, 2. MORTGAGE, 15. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION,
36.
1. In divorce a former adjudication need not be specially pleaded, it may
be given in evidence at the trial. Blain v. Blain, 57.
2. Dismissing a petition for divorce in New Hampshire for want of proof,
no bar to granting divorce in New York. Id.
3. A judgment in a former action is no lar to second action for same cause,
if the latter had not then accrued. Marcellui v. Countryinan, 57.
4. Parol evidence is admissible to show that the second demand was not
recovered in first action. Id.
5. No rule is more necessary to enforce good faith than that which estops
a person from enforcing claims which lie has induced others to suppose lie would
not rely on. Faxton v. Ftxon et al., 453.
6. Merely endorsing a mortgage with the word " cancelled" ani signing
the mortgagee's initials, amounts to nothing hut evidence of intention, unless
there is an actual agreement with the mortgagor on whichl he has relied. Id.
7. Husband and wife having recovered judgment against a town fur injurici
caused to wire by defect in highway, in a suit for loss o" wife's ;ervices, the
town ii estopped to deny facts found against it in former action. Lindsey v.
Town qf Danville, 713.
8. Itf the jury think the sum paid for necessary labor substituted for the
wife's services, is the measure of a just compensation they may find damages
to that amount. Id.
9. Whether interest is recoverable in an action of tort or not, the jury may
consider time in fixing damages. rd.
10. Evidence to show that the wife was in ill health prior to the injury is
inadmissible. Id.
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2.

See

DEED, 3.

ADMIRALTY, 9.
BILLS AtD NOTES, 4, 6.
ESTOPPEL, 4, 10.
STAMP, 3.

CRIMINA,

LAW,

I. Generally.

1. In trespass evidence is admissible to show that the deed for the locus in
quo though dated! before was not delivered until after the issuing of the writ.
Mafzxwell v. Mitchell, 128.
2. Evidence reported upon a motion for new trial, which has been overruled by con ent, cannot be considered in hearing upon exceptions. Id.
3. Of fraud is not required to be more direct and positive than facts tending
to the inference of it. Rea v. Missouri, 327.
4. Evi leice dehors the writing may be given, where any doubt arises upon
the true -ene and meaning of the words of!the written contract. Newark Hudson Railroadv. Sanford, 391.
5. Courts will take judicial notice of the date of resumption of mail service
between two towns after the war. Clay, Administrator, v. Potton, 392.
6. They will not take notice without other proof that the late war was safficient to prevent notice of dishonor to an endorsee, during its continuance.
Al.
7. The records of the Post-office Department afford evidence of the restoration of mail service to the seceding states. Id.
8. An account sale unless proved in the ordinary way can only be received
in evidence on the ground of contract.
Coe.s v. Nash, 451.
9. Where the date of a sale, attacked fair fraud, is material, evidence that
some months after its date, the vendor called on a lawyer to write a transfer
of the goods, is competent and relevant. 3foug v. Benedict, 455.
10. Identity of name is evidence of identity. of persons. Id, 457.
11. The possession of the record of a judgment rendered by a justice gives
no room for the presumption that the holder is the party plaintiff. Bennett v.
Libheart, 457.
12. It cannot be assumed as a legal presumption that where the initials
and family name are the same the persons are identical. Id.
13. Proof that witness had been in corre pondence with writer of letter offered in evidence for more than a year, and thought the signature genuine, is
sufficient to receive it. Smith v. Amazon In$. Co., 589.
14. Congress may prescribe the nanner in which copies of the records of
the department, may be authenticated.
3f&Lane v. Bovej, 649.
15. Parol evidence is admissible to explain a receipt which does not constitute a contract. Randall v. Kelsey, 649.
16. Tim receipt of an internal revenue collector is proper evidence to show
payment of the tax. Id.
17. While evidence is admissible to show motive in the accused, yet where
the crime charged was the burning of a barn belonging to himself, in order to
get the insurance, the record of a suit in equity against him to recover the
barn, &c., where he had filed an answer denying the complainant's equity,
"&c., was too remote to he admissible for the purpose of showing motive.
Hamilton v. Tbe People, 679.
18. Where evidence is circumstnilial, a wide latitude should be allowed
to defendant in cross-examination to show the whole bearing of the ftacts alleged.
Id.
19. Where a co-defendant in a criminal case turns state's evidence and has
tried to convict thers by proof also convicting, himself, lie will be held to
have waived all privilege of refusing to answer as to any fhcts bearing on
the issue. And this waiver extends to all communications made to his
counsel, so as to make both himself end his counsel compellable to disclose
such communications.
Id.
20. Where a party a-king a questfon gets an answer that is not responsive
but which would have been alnissible in answer to a question calling for it,
the other party has no right to object to it and have it stricken out of the testimony. Id.
21. Evidence to impeach a witness must be confined to his reputation for
veracity, but the attacking witness having shown his knowledge on that point
may be asked if he would believe the other on oath. Id.
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22. The Supreme Court of the United States does not take judicial notice
of the orders issued by a military commander. Burke v. Mltenberqer, 709.
23. It is not s.ufficient for a defendant, who is testifying to Ahnt a deceased
witness proved on a former trial, to testify substantially, he must give all.
Black v. Richardson, 777.

24. A receipt in full of a demand, is primndfacie a perfect defence.
ette v. Town of Bolton, 777.

Guiy-

II. Privil.qed Conuunications.

25. To make communications to counsel privileged, they must he made to
them confidentially as counsel in the case in which they are madle. Earle v.
Grout, 709.
26. The facts that make them privileged must be proved, and the burden of
proof is on him who seeks to exclude them. Id.
27. The declarations of an agent are admissible against his principal, if
made in the execution of the agency. Id.
II. Admissions, Declarations, &c. See CORPORATTONS. 6.
28. It is competent for the assistant United States marshal who took the
census for the district, and made the return to the office of the clerk of the
courts for the county, when the record does not show the specific locality
where the individuals enumerated resided, to testify as to their place of residence. State v. W'aqner, 106.
29. The outcries of a person deceased made during the perpetration of the
assault which results in death, or upon the approach of the assailant, are
competent evidence upon the trial of a party charged with the murder of such
person, and may be considered by the jury with other eircumstancet and testimony upon the question of the identity of the accused. Id.
30. The outcries of another person who was murdered by the same party
a few minutes previously, during the perpetration of one and the same burglary, but on another part of the premises, arc admitted under like circumd.
stances for the same purposes upon such trial.
31. Such exclamations are competent as part of the res gestce. Id.
32. Moreover their admission may be distinctly justified for the same reasons which are held to justify the admission of dying declarations. Id.
33. The contents of the prisoner's pockets found when lie is arrested may
he put in evidence when there is testimony tending to show that they or a
portion of them came from the recent possession of the deceased or from the
locality of the crime. Id.
34. Articles which a witness identifies as the property of the prisoner, and
in his possession shortly before the crime was committed, when fitund shortly
after its perpetration, at the house where the crime was committed, may be
offered in evidence. Id.
35. The confession of a prisoner induced by threats or promises is inadmissible. Nicholson v. State, 194.
36. The onus of showing that a confession was not made by inducement is
on the prosecutor. Id.
37. Admissibility of confession is to be determined by the court and not by
the jury. Id.
38. Where two are interested in a transaction the acts and statements of
either in regard to it may be put in evidence as showing the quo anilno. Beebe
v. Knapp el al., 457.
39. Where a witness dies the notes of his testimany before a justice are admissible. Brown v. Conmnionwal h, 523.
40. The dying, declarations of a wife are not evidence on the trial for the
murder of her husband. Id.
41. One condition on which the declaration of deceased persons in regard to
boundaries is received, is that they had knowledge of them. Hadley v. Howe,
649.

IV.

42. Such knowledge must be proved. Id.
-xlert.s.
43. The admission of a lawyer who had no more experience than lawyers
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generally to testify as an expert in a question of handwriting was erroneous.
Ellingwood v. Bragg, 57.

44. The ruling of a judge at nisi prius as to an expert will not be revised.
Id.
45. The opinions of persons not witnesses through whose hands a treasury
note has passed, as to its genuineness, are not admissible in evidence in a suit
brought by one who has taken such note to recover its value. Atwood v. Cornwall, 230.

46. The statement of a fact by one of the parties, in the presence of the
other and not denied, is admissible as evidence of the fact §o stated. Id.
47. Bankers are competent to testify as to the genuineness of a treasury
note. Id.
48. When the matter of inquiry is such that inexperienced persons are unlikely to prove- capable of forming a correct judgment upon it, the opinion of
experts is admissible. Davis v. The State, 255.
49. The evidence of medical experts is admissible to show how in their
opinion certain wounds were inflicted upon tie head of a murdered man. Id.
50. Tie provision in Wisconsin Statutes that no physician shall testify un-

less he has a diploma, only applies when such a person is called as an expert.
Afontgomnerql v. Twn of Scott, 777.
51. A physician examined a,; an expert may testify as to the probable effects
of injuries upon the future health. Id.
52. A physician testifying that both bones of the plaintiff's leg were broken
is not giving an opinion as an expert. Id.
EXECUTION.

See

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,

54, 55.

WAt, 2.

1. A constable's sale of personal property which is not present and subject
to inspection is invalid. Gaskill v. dldricl, 195.
2. Where an execution-creditor purchases at execution-sale, and his judgment is subsequently reversed and restitution awarded, the title revests in
the execution-debtor, but where, before the reversal, the execution-creditor
conveys to a stranger who purchases in good faith, he will hold the title unaffected by the reversal. Vogler v. Montgomery et al., 244.
. 3. An exception to this rule is where the property sold is one that iq exempt from sale by the Homestead Act. In such case the purchaser acquiring
no title can convey none even to a stranger. Id.
4. Individual partners are entitled to exemption out of partnership assets.
Howard v. Jones and Starke, 457.
5. The right of exemption is an incident of ownership as long as the owner
chooses to exert it and the property is withip the control of the court. Id.
6. A widow who supported herself and daughter by keeping a boardinghouse at G. in Connecticut, owning a quantity of furniture suitable for a boarding-house, took a furnished house for a year in the city of New York, and
went there to keep boarders, intending to return to G. at the end of the year
and resume her business there. Her furniture was stored in the meantime in
G. and while so stored was attached bv a creditor. Held(1.) That the furniture, if otherwise exempt, did not hecome open to attachment by reason of its being stored and not in actual use.
(2.) That the furniture was not exempt as being necessary for the use of
her boarders, nor on the ground that the boorders were a part of her family.
(3.) That the inquiry is, what wn necessary for the personal comfort of
the ftamily, as such ; but that the term " lamy"nil' in this case was not litmited
to the mother and daughter alone, but, as she was keeping boarterq. might
properly include a servant, and in any case would include a vi.itor, or a dependent relative who was living in the fatnily.
(4.) That in determining what was necessary household furniture, her occupation might properly be considered, and if her keeping boarders made it
necessary for her to have more furniture for her personal use, as an additional
bureau, or ather like convenience, such additional furniture would be exempt.
Weed v. Da.yton, 603.
7. A debtor cannot by an executory contract, such as a stipulation in a promissory note, waive the benefit of the state exemption laws, so as to estop

INDEX.
EXECUTION.
hiimself from subsequently claiming the exemption.

M3oxleyj v. Raqun el al.,

743.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.
1. It is no. defence to a suit b% legatees, that the executor invested the
funds in bonds of the Confederate States, though such investment was approved by the Probate Court. Horn v. Lockhat, 334.
2. The acts of the States in their individual capacities, so far as they did
not impair the just rights of citizens under the Constitution, are in general
to be treated as valid. Id.
FALSE IMPRISONMENT.
1. In an action for false imprisonment evidence of the reputation of the
bad chareacter of the plaintiff, in respect to the offence charged, is inadmissible. Scheer v. Keown, 589.
2. If plaintiff's bad character was one of the grounds of defendant's suspicion, he should have set it up in his answer. Id.
FEE.

See WILL, 1.

FENCES.
1. Enclosures of railroads, as required by the Act of March 25th 1859 of
larietta 6- CinOhio, must be separate from that of adjoining proprietors.
cinnati R. v. Stephenson, 649.
2. The obligation on the part of railroads to maintain fences extends to the
public generally. Id.
3. The English rule requiring owners of cattle to restrain them from runfing at large has never been the law of Ohio. Id.
4. The owner of cattle running at large is not guilty of a breach of anduty imposed by the Act of April 13th 1865, if they are at large without
omission of reasonable care. Id.
5. In an action to recover one-half the value of a partition fence under
the Act of May 3d 1859 of Ohio, the appraisal of the township trustees is
conclusive as respects the value. Robb T. Brachmann, 650.
6. The fact that the fence is better than required, does not preclude the
Id.
plaintiff from recovering.
7. Nor that it does not strictly conform to the boundary line between the
parties. Id.
FIXTURES.
1. What are fixtures depends upon the particular circumstances of the case.
Quinbq v. Manhattan Co., 328.
2. As between mortgagor and mortgagee when the fixture appertains to
the real estate and is necessary for its enjoyment, it will be treated as realty.
Id.
3. That the fixtures were called personal property in the deed to the mortgagor cannot affect their character as between him and the mortgagee. Id.
4. There are three requisites for determining the character.
1. Actual annexation to the realty.
2. Application to the use or purpose for which the realty is appropriated.
Id.
3. The intention of the party making the annexation.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 11,
FRAUD.
See AUCTION. BANKRUPTCY,35.
12, 25, 26.
1. If there has been fraud in the sale ofoil stoc(k the purcha'er could reseind
and recover back price, but the tender munt be in a reasonable time after discoverv of !he fraud. Learning et al. v. W[ise et al., 394.
2. If one recklessly makes a false representation to induce another to enter
into a contract, he is liable for the fraud and contract may be rescinded.
Beebe v. Knapp et al., 457.
3. Where an administrator sells his intestate's land to A. without authority
of law, so that the title remains in the heir, and B. obtains a conveyance from
the heir for a nominal consideration, by fraudulently representing that he was
procuring it for A., the legal title pas.es to B., but A. or his grantee has
an equitable interest in the land by reason of such fraud. Lombard v. Cow.
ham, 710.
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4. Equity has control of a deed obtained by fraud, for the purpose of grant.
ing relief. Loibnard v. Cowhann, 710.
5. Where fraud in procuring a deed does not make it void, it is no legal
defence to an ejectment on the deed. Id.
FRAUDS OF STATUTE. See BILLS AND NOTES, 19. VENDOR AND FURCIHASER, 16.

I. A parol agreement to pay for services in land is void. Campbell v.
Canzpbell, 195.
2. Such agreement is void only as to the land, the party may sue for what
such services are reasonably worth. Id.
3. STUDIES IN THE LAW OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS, 593. 602, 721.
4. Contracts within the Statute of Frauds, because not put in writing, are

not illegal. Montgomery v. Edwards, 650.
5. The inability to enforce them is an immunity which the defendant may
waive. Id.
6. The parol promise of defendant to pay all claims that might thereafter
arise against the administrator, in consideration of his putting all the assets
of the estate in his hands, is not within the statute.

Randall v. Kesei, 650.

7. If the name of the agent, with whom a contract for the purchase of real
estate iq made, appears in the written memorandum, the statute is satisfied
although the name of the principal is not disclosed. Walsh v. Burton, 655.
FREIGHT. See CONTRACT, 6.
GAMBLING.
A speculative option to deliver gools within a certain time at a specified
price, where the object of tlhe parties is not a sale and delivery of the goods,
but a settlement in money on differences-commonly called a " put,"-is a
wagering contract and void, either as within the statutes against gambling or
as against public policy. In re Chandler, 310.
GATE.

See 'VAT, 1, 2.

GIFT.

1. The endorsement of payment of part of a mortgage, made by the mortgage under mortgagor's direction, is indicative of a gift or forgiveness of
part of the debt. Green, Administrator,v. Lan gdon et al., 458.
2. It the absence of any rule of law to prevent the donor's intention it must
be sustained. Id.
3. Tlough delivery and acceptance of a gift are essential to its validity,
where tangible property is concerned, yet where it is part of a sum due, it
does not admit of technical delivery. Id.

GUARANTY.
HAY.
HEIR.

See MORTGAGE, 8, 9.

-See DECEDENTS' ESTATE, 2.
See ESTATES.

HIGHWAY. See ESTOPPEL, 7. NUISANCE, 3.
1. Dedication and acceptance by the public create a highway without regard to time of user. Ciapman v. Swan, 257.
2. Neither recognition nor acquiescence can operate by way of estoppel
until twenty years have run, after that the right of the public is perfect. Id.
3. Though towns are not obliged to keep the whole highway fit for use, the
I'right v. Suunders, 257.
principle cannot apply to streets of a village.
4. No person whether owner or not has a right to obstruct a highway. Id.
5. Obstructions in a highway are public nuisances, and may be abated by
any person injured. Id.
6. Digging post-holes in a street is a nuisance, though in a part not capable of use. ld.
7. Where the act done is a nuisance the liability of the party causing it follows of course. Id.
8. Township authorities have a special interest in highways beyond that of
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the public at large, and may file a bill in their corporate name to prevent
their destruction. Township qf Greenwich v. Easton 4 Amboy R. R., 330.
9. A railroad company authorized to change the location of a road if they
deem it nece.ssaryl, cannot do so because it is to their pecuniary advantaeq. Id.
10. A traveller sustaining an injury by reason of a defect in a highway attributable to the negligence of the corporation hound to maintain it, is not
barred of his right to recover by reason of the fact that on his own part an
accident has contributed to the injury, if it is in no way attributable to his own
negligence. Baldwin v. Turnpike Co., 423.
1I.And it does not affect the case that the accident occurred upon another
road over which the defendants had no control. Id.
12. It is not necessary that ordinary care should have been exercised by
the plaintiff at the very time and place of the injury, if such accident has rendered the exercise of such care impracticable. Id.
13. The plaintiff's horse, driven by his servant in his carriage along a publichighway, in the exercise of ordinary care, became frightened by the breaking of the carriage in consequence of a defect for which no negligence was
attributable to the plaintiff, and ran furiously, throwing out the driver, soon
after which i left the highway and passed over private property to and
upon a turnpike road, where, still running furiously, he fell over the side of
a bridge by reason of a defect in the railing and was injured, such defect
being attributable to the negligence of the turnpike company. Held, that the
turnpike company was liable for the injury. Id.
14. A traveller is not responsible for a secret defect in his carriage or harness, where there has been no want of ordinary care on his part in relation to
it. Id.
15. It is the duty of a person travelling on a public highway to turn to the
right on meeting one coming in the opposite direction. Daniels v. Clegg,
458.
16. In case of collision the one driving on the left would be liable. .d.
17. In using a highway one has a right to expect ordinary prudence from
others and to rely on it in determining his course. Id.
18. It lies with the party injured by a collision to prove negligence or misconduct on the other's part. Id.
19. The " travelled part of the road" is that part which is wrought for
travelling, and not simply the wheel track. Id.
20. Under the Laws of 1864 of Wisconsin, it is the duty of each overseer
of highways, whenever any portion of the highway in his district is rendered
impassable by snow drifts, to immediately put it in passable order. McfJCabe
v. The Town of Hammond, 653.
21. A town will not be chargeable with negligence, and liable in an action
for injuries received in consequence of the pavements being obstructed by
snow drifts, unless by the exercise of reasonable care, they could have been
removed. Id.
22. Whether they could have been removed in time, is a question for a jury
to determine. Id.
23. A town is liable for injuries from the highway being of insufficient
width, although the jury find that the injury resulted from an obstruction for
which the town was in no way liable. Fulsome v. Town of Concord, 714.
24. A witness who had examined the place of accident and measured the
width, can testify that in his opinion the highN:.ty was not wide enough for
two teams to pass. Id.
HIOLYDAY.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 4.

HOMESTEAD. See BANxRuPrTCY, 32. TIME, 5.
1. The orator alleged in his b.ll
that R., his ward, was the owner of a farm
in F. and had a homestead therein, and that he was adjudged a bankrupt,
and the defcnlant appointed his assignee, and that said homestead was decreed to R. by the Court of Bankruptcy ; titht R. absconded, and the orator
was appointed his guardilan ; that the defendant thereafterwards obtained judgment by default against R., before a justice of the peace, without the service
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of process, notice, or recognisance for review, and levied his execution upon,
and set off, said homestead ; that it was the duty of the orator, as such guardian, to sell said homestead for the support of l.'s family, hut that said levy
and set-off hindered and impeded his selling the same, and constituted a
cloud upon the title thereof; and prayed that said cloud he removed. The
answer averred that the Court of Bankruptcy adiudgcd that I. had a holnestead interest in said farm ; that the dfendant;s claim upon which said judgment was founded, was anterior to the acquisition of said homestead, and
that said homestead was not exempt from said levy and set-off.

The case

was heard on bill and answer. Held, that the case was not one for the interposition of a court of equity. Rooney v. Soule, 36.
2. Homestead laws should be liberally construed, with the view of promoting the benevolent purpose of securing to a family a home, protected from
the creditors of the person who is its head. Vogler v. ilfontgontery, 244.
3. The homestead exemption is for the benefit of the family, and a sale
thereof under execution is void. The exemption need not be claimed, anti the
possession and use of property, as a homestead, are notice to the officer making a levy that it is held as such. Id.
4. When the homestead exceeds in amount or value the statutory limitation, it is the duty of the officer holding an execution, before making a levy,
to proceed under the provisions of the statute to have the homestead appraised
and set apart. Id.
5. The conveyance and repurchase of a homestead, without a relinquishment of possession, even though made in fraud of creditors, does not constitute an abandonment of the homesteai. Id.
6. The sale of a homestead under execution will be restrained in equity,
on the ground that it will cast a cloud over the title of the owner. Id.
7. M. and wife conveyed their farm to their daughter. M. was subsequently adjudged a bankrupt anti on a bill by his assiL'nce the deed was tieclared fraudulent and void as to creditors. M. anti wile then clainmed a part
of the farm as their homestead. The bankruptcy court, without deciding
this claim, ordered the land sold, subject to any legal claim of M.. and a purchaser having bought-accordingly, brought ejcctment for the part claimed :and
occupied by i. as a homestead. Held, that the purchaer wa not entitled to
recover. The deed being set aside the title reverted to M., ani then passed
to his assignee subject to the exemptions of the Bankrupt Act, as it"the deed
had never been made. McFarlandv. Goodinan, 697.
8. The fact that M.'s deed to his daughter reserved the right to occupy
the land as a hotiiestead during his life, held to strengthen the foregoing conelusion but not to be necessary to it. i.
9. The voluntary joining of a wife in a deed which is afterwards set aside as
fraudulent against creditors, does not prevent her, on such setting aside, from
claiming her dower or homestead in the land. ld.
HUSBAND AND WIFE. See WILL, 7. WITNESs, 4.
I. Marriage and Divorce. See ESTOPPEL, 1.
1. A marriage will not be annulled for impotence. elnonyinous, 56.
2. The Court of Chancery of New Jersey will annul a contract of marriage
outside of its statutory jurisdiction only where the contract is void. Id.
3. A widow claiming the right to administer upon the estate of a ,leceased
person is notcotapetentunder the Acts or 1864 andl 1868 of Maryland to testify
as to thefiactum of her marriage. Riedgrave v. Reuiqravte, 259.
4. Where parties live together ostensibly as man and wife the law will presume that they have been legally married. Id.
5. Where proof is offered from which a marriage may be inferred, the presumption is that it was legally contracted according to the law of the country
where it occurred. Id.
6. The validity of a marriage made in a foreign country is recognised in
Maryland, though some of the ceremonies required in the latter state are wanting. Id.
7. The consent of the parties is all that is required for a valid marriage
Richard v. Brehm, 393.
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8. If the contract be made per verba defuturo and is followed by consummation it is valid. Richard v. Brehrn, 393.
9. Marriage may be proved by reputation, declarations and conduct of the
parties. i1.
10. Cohabitation and reputation are necessary to establish a presumption
where there is no proof of actual marriage. Id.
11. Where husband covenants in a deed of separation, to pay an annuity
to his wife '-so long as they shall live separate," a divorce for the subsequent
adultery of the wife, will not release him from the payment. Charlesworth v.
Holt, 590.
12. A covenant by husband and wife in a marriage settlement, to settle
after-acquired property of the wife, does not extend to property to which wife
becomes entitled after husband's death. Be Edwards, 590.
II. Curtesy and Dower. See CONVERSION, 1, 2. HOMESTEAD, 9. WILL, 4.
13. Prior to Act of 1863 of Maine, a minor feme covert could not bar her
right to dower, by joining in execution of her husband's deed. Dela v. Stanwood, 125.
14. That act could not defeat existing right of widow to dower. Id.
15. Where wife joins in deed with her husband to bar dower, she will not
he barred a- against one holding by attachment against husband prior to said
deed. French v. Crosbkq, 257.
16. Where by an ante-nuptial agreeement, wife accepts a pecuniary compensation in lieu of dower, and on the death of the husband, without electing
to waive the provision in the agreement, but induced by the fraud and artifice
of the only son anl heir, accepts it in full of all claim, and retains it, she
will be barred of (lower and homestead. Huthaway v. Hathaway's Est., 778.
17. Without waiver and notice in writing, the Probate Court has no power
to decree wife homestead and dower. Id.
III. Powers of Married lomen.
18. A contract by a married woman for sale of her real estate and a deed
executed by her alone is void. Phelps v. Morrison, 56.
19. A judgment against the husbanl is no notice to wife's grantee if the
title is in her. Id.
20. Such judgment is no encumbrance on the property. Id.
21. A married woman has not capacity to enter into a general mercantile
partnership not connected with or relating to her separate property, and where
she assumes to do so'with the consent of her husband, and is by him assisted
in managing and carrying on the business, the husband, and not the wife, is
to be regarded in law as the partner. Swasey v. Antran, 577.
22. A fene covert having obtained a " permit" to trade within the lines
of the army, with the knowledge and consent of her husband entered into a
partnership with other persons, for the purpose of buying and selling goods
and merchandise under said '"permit," and herself, with the assistance of
her husband, managed and conducted the business. The firm was subsequently dissolved, and its property transferred by the other partners to her,
siae
agreeing to pay all the partnership debts. She then sold the property to
S., who had notice of all the facts, and who in like manner agreed to pay
the partnership debts. This was all done with the knowledge and concurrence of the husband, who joined her in executing the bill of sale to S. In
an action by a creditor of the firm against the husband and the other memhers of the firm, not including the wife: Held, that the goods in the hands of
S., or the price agreed by him to be paid therefor, and not yet paid, are
liable to attachment iu the action. id.
IV. Separate Estate.
23. A married woman to whom possession of land is delivered under a parol
gift, and who occupies the land uninterruptedly, adversely and exclusively as
her own for fifteen years, thereby acquires a complete title in herself, subject to an estate by curtesy in her husband, where the husband, although living with her, claims no independent, exclusive occupation in himself. Clarke
et x. v, Gilbert, 19.
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24. Where a debt is contracted partly for necessaries and partly by wife for
goods for resale, the separate estate of the wife is not discharged from liability.
Parker v. Dillard, 58.
25. Husband may permit wife to have the savings of her industry as her
separate property. Rivers v. Charlton, 58.
26. Bill in equity by wife, against her husband's mortgagee for her property
acquired by her savings, should allege that they were with her husband's consent. Id.
27. A married woman may charge her separate real estate with the payment of a debt contracted by herself and husband, by means of a joint promissory note. H-all 4-Hume v. Eccleston, 195.
28. Equity will enforce such a contract against the separate estate of the
wife. Id.
29. A deed from a married woman of her separate estate directly to her
husband, is a nullity. Preston, Trustee, v. Feiyer, 258.
30. Where property which is sold under a decree in equity is represented
as of indisputable title, and it turns out to be defective, the court will require
d.
the trustee to refund the purchase-money even 'after ratification.
31. Husband may convey a reasonable amount of property to his wife, and
it will be valid against future creditors. Brookban v. Kennard, 258.
d.
32. Such conveyance may be without intervention of trustees.
33. That the conveyance was not recorded for a year will not render it
void. Id.
34. Land conveyed to a husband by his wife's guardian in satielaction of
a decree in hcr favor on settlement of guardianship account, will e decreed
to be her separate property. Fry et a/. v. Bammer, 459.
35. A note and mortgage of the land to secure its payment, executed by
the wife and husband for money to pay off an outstanding mortgage, imposed
no liability on her or the land. Id.
36. By an ante-nuptial contract between B. and L. in 1857, B. agreed that
certain bank and other stocks, then conveyed by him to a trustee, should I.e
held by the trustee for the sole use of L. during her life, and be suhiect to any
disposition she might make of them by will or written appointment; the same
to be in lieu of dower and of all distributory share of his personal property
if she should survive him. Held, that the right to the income from the stocks
did not, under the statute (General Statutes, tit. 13, see. 20), vest in the husband on the marriage, but that it belonged to the wife as her sole and separate estate. Boardman's Appeal, 477.
37. After the marriage in 1857 until his death in 1871, B. received the
dividends upon the stocks, upon a power of attorney from the trustee, without
objection from his wife, rendering no account to her and keeping none, she
not notifying him in any way that she should claim them as her own. It was
found however that she had never in fact intended to relinquish her right to
them, and did not suppose she had done so ; that she suppoqed he was investing them for her benefit, a belief which was strengthened hy occasional expressions of his ; and that from motives of delicacy she did not inquire of
him, he being uncommunicative on all business matters. It also appeared
that the dividends were not needed or used for family support, B.'s income
from other property being far in excess of the family expcditure. . Held, that
she was entitled to recover their whole amount from his estate, with interet..
ld.
38. A large amount of the dividends so received by B. had been from time
to time invested by him in the name of the trustee in additional stocks of
the same description. In 1870 B. procured a power of attorney from the
trustee and transferred to himself all the stocks so acquired, intending to convert them to his own use. His wife had no knowledge of the transaction,
and did not in fact know until after B.'s death that the dividends from the
original trust stocks had been invested in such additional trust stocks. Held,
that her rights were not affected by the transaction. id.
39. B., soon after this transaction and in pursuance of a general purpose,
made a new will, in which he referred to the ante-nuptial contract and con-
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firmed it. and gave to his widow his mansion-house and $200,000 for her life;
stating his object to be to make abundant provision for her support and comfort, in lieu of dower and of all share in his real and personal estate. It appeared frou evidence outside of the will that B. did not expect his widow to
make a claim upon his estate for the dividends he had received, and that he
male the foregoint, provision for her in his will in that belief; ako that the
provisions of the will in her favor had been made known to her and that she
had expressed herself fully satisfied with them. Hleld, that it was of questionable propriety to go outside of the will for evidence of the purpose anl
tnder-tauding of the testator ; but that the will, taken by itself, or in connectiol with the fhcts stated, did not make the acceptance of its provisions by the
widow a bar of her right to present a claim against the estate for an indebtedness. Boardan'sAppral, 477.
40. And &d, that her right to any portion of the sums received by B. as
dividends was not barred hy the Statute of Limitations.
d.
V. Actions il aul against.
41. A married woman is not liable upon a special promike to pay her husband's debt, unless made in a form to bind her separate estate. Lennox v.
Eldrd, 125.
42. Nor on a verbal promise made after his death. Id.
43. A wife whose goods have been levied upon by a creditor of her husband, is entitled in an action of trespass ie onis asporat is, to damages,
punitive if the defendant acted after notice. Strasbaryer v. Barber, 258.
44. Under the Code of Maryland, a married woman may sue in trespass
de boais asporlatis,by her next friend, without joining her husbanl. Id.
45. A note and mortgage given by a married woman for a loan to purchase
land, imposes no personal liability on her, nor on the land. Riley et al. v.
Pierce, 392.

46. The statutes of Illinois having given a married woman the sole control
of her property and earnings, free from any control or interference of the
husband, the necessary operation of such statutes is to discharge the latter
from any liability for the wile's torts committed during coverture out of his
presence and without his participation. Martin v. Robson, 547.
ICE.

See CONSTITUTIONAL

ILLEGITIMATES.

LAw,

48.

See P'ARTITION, I.

INFANT. See Pa.ACTIcs, 6.
I. The contract of an infant can be rescinded by its parent and a suit maintained for recovery of money paid under it. Sequin v. Peterson, 58.
2. Need not himself he free from fault to entitle him to recover damages
for fault of another. Railroad v. Slout, 330.
3. Infant of tenler years is not within the ordinary rule, that an employee
cannot recover against his employer for the carelessness of a co-employee
which results in injury. Railroadv. Fort, 331.
4. The privilege of infancy cannot be used as a weapon of attack or fraud,
and an infant cannot repudiate his tIced and regain the property without restoring the consideration paid for it. Prout v. Wiley, 460.
5. Delay alone will not operate as an affirmance of a deed executed dttring
minority, nor prevent a minor from reclaiming the land, at any period Within
the Statute of imimations.
1.
6. A parent in sending his child to school surrenders to the teacher such
control over the child as is necessary for the proper government aind di.-ipline of tile school. But where tle parent desires that tile child shall omit a
part of the regular course of study and so directs him, the teacher has ut,
paramomunt authority to enforce the study of the omitted part, and corporal
punishment of the chili for disobedience under such circumstances is an unlawful assault. Arorrowv. Mood, 692.
7. The fact that the school was a public one, in twhich
the studies were
prescribed by statute, h, hi not to vary the general rule as to the right of a
parent to direct the omission of part of the prescribed studies. Id..
VOL. XXII.-53
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INJUNCTION. See HOMESTEAD, 6; MORTGAGE, 2; MUNICIPAL CORPOR,TION, 1, 2, 10; NUISANCE, 3, 4; TRESPASS, 3.
1. Will be granted to prevent persons from keeping forcible possession of a
church edifice, and preventing its regularly elected and qualified trustees from
entering. Lutheran Ev. Church v. Gristqouet al., 589.
2. 1v such injunction the plaintiff by its trustees may be restored to possession without any further order. Id.
INSOLVENT. See DEBTOR AND CRFDITOR, 1, 2, 4; INSURANCE, 2.
1. A state cannot Ibvlegislative act appropriate the assets of an insolvent
bank to the injury of olher creditors. Barings v. Dabney, 590.
2. Such an act would be repugnant to that clause of the constitution, prohibiting a law impairing the obligation of contracts. Id.
INSURANCE. See Co1stox CARRIER, I. WAR.
I. Whether an over-valuation and proof of loss befraudulent or not is a
question of fact tbr the jury. Williams v. Phoenix Co., 125.
2. One who dies insolvent can make no disposition of the fund accruing
from ELlife insurance policy, if lie leaves neither widow nor child. Such in
ney becomes assets for payment of debts. Hiathaway v. Shernian, 260.
3. An intention on the part of a testator to change the direction given by
law to this species of property is not to be inferred from general provisions in
his will. Id.
4. When a policy containing the words " such other risks as may be agreed
upon, as per endorsement, accepted by the company," has the ri-k agreed on,
the premium paid and the endorsement made by an agent, the insurance is
effected. Wass v. Maine M1arine Insurance Co., 260.
5. A contract of insurance is executory until the expiration of the term of
insurance. U. S. Insurance Co. of Baltimore v. Tardq, 393.
6. If the company becomes insolvent the insured may put an end to the contract. Id.
7. The amount of unearned premiums to be returned in ease of insolvency
is the portion applicable to the time not covered by the risk with interest from
the termination of contract. Id.
8. The demand for unearned premiums is a chose in action which may he
sold without writing. Id.
9. An inaccurate representation (not a warranty) believed to be true,
would not defeat an action on a policy. Imperial Fire Ins. Co. v. Mfurray, 393.
10. The insurable interest of a lessee is the value of the property lie is
bound to replace. Id.
11.Where a policy expressly makes the application a part of itself, and
a warranty of all the statements in it, it will be so considered and must be
strictly true to authorize a recovery on the policy. American Ins. Co. v. Gilbert, 460.

12.
13.
void,
14.
ment

Parties may .ontract on such conditions as they see fit. Id.
When it is expressly provided that over-valuation shall make the policy
k ii error to submit to the jury, whether it was clone in good faith. Id.
Whether an insurance comlany'can le held upon the process of garnishdepends upon the state of the claim at the time of service of process.
JMartz v. Detroit F. 4- M. Ins. C). Garnishee of Heebel, 461.
15. Where the claim is contingent it cannot he held. Id.
16. An insurance company having issued certain policies reinsured them in
another company. A loss occurred and subsequently the first company lecame insolvent. The second company then bought up some of the policies at
a discount. Held:
(I.) That it was an investment within the corporate powers of the second
-company and not against public policy.
(2.) That in an action by the assignees in bankruptcy of the first
ermpany to recover the amount of the reinsurance, the second company could set
off the purchased policies at their fac-value. Hove1 v. Hone In,. Co., 511.
17. A life-policy i-sued by a foreign company, is not rendered void lbvthe
neglect of the company to comply with the provisions of the Act of April 16th
1867, providing for the incorporation and regulation of insurance companies ;
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nor will such neglect, in an action brought against the company on the
policy, excuse the policy-holder from paying premiums according to the terms
of the policy. Union Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. McMullen, 610.
18. Where a lil-policy is made andaccepted, upon the expressed condition
that if the fiunual premium is not fully paid within the time specified, the
policy "shall be null and void, and wholly foriited," the failure to pay the
premium avoids the policy. Id.
19. Where the policy also provideq that no agent of the company, except
the president and secretary, cn waive such forfeiture, authority conferred
upon ao agent before the premiums became due to collect them, does not
impliedly invest him with authority to waive the forfeiture. I'd.
20. Notwithstanding the limitation upon the power of agents, declared in
the policy in respect to waiving the forfeiture, the company is competent to
invest such authority in any of its agents. The authority may be express, or
it may be implied from circumstances, but the burden of showing it in either
case, is on the party claiming the benefit of its exercise. Id.
21. An agent, having no authority to waive the forfeiture, acting in the interest of the assured, received the unpaid part of a premium on a forfeited
policy, after the life insured had ended, for which he gave a receipt antedated,
and forwarded the money to the company, concealing the facts as to such payment. Held, that the receiving of the money by the company, in ignorance
of such facts, was no ratification of the act of the agent in receiving the money. Id.
22. The fact that the company, on tendering hack the money so received,
omitted to return certain notes given in part payment of premiums, but which
the forfeiture of the policy rendered uneollectable, will not affect the rights
of the parties in a suit on the policy ; nor is the fact that the notes are payable to order material, where they show on their face the consideration for
which they were given. Id.
23. When before the expiration of time of proving loss, the insurer
denies all liability entirely upon other grounds, it is a waiver of the condition
requiring proofs of loss. Smith v. Amazon Ins. Co., 651.
24. Where the question in the application relating to the ownership of the
property, was filled in by the agent of the insurer without asking the insured,
a mistake will be held the mistake of the insurer and cannot defeat the policy.
.d.
25. An unintentional mistake in the proofs of loss will not prevent a recovery on the policy. Id.
26. A contract of insurance made in another state on property situated in
New Jersey is valid and will be enforced here. Columbia Fire Ins. Co. v.
Kinyon, 674.
27. Although it would be competent by legislation to invalidate in our
courts an insurance contract made in good faith in another state on property
located here, it would be so contrary to the comity which has been observed
between the states, that such an intention will not be imputed to the law-makers, unless the language used so clearly expresses that purpose as to bear no
other reasonable interpretation. Id.
28. The regulations of our insurance laws are not merely for the purpose of
revenue, they impair the contract made in violation of them, so far at least as
concerns the right of the foreign corporation to sue upon it. Whether public
policy requires that the party insured shall'be permitted to enforce the agreement is not decided. Id.
29. The declaration is defective in that it does not show that when the assessinent was made upon the deposit note the defendant was a member of the
company and as such liable to assessment, nor does it show that the losses
assessed accrued while the defendant's policy was alive, or that the assessment was made on the basis authorized by the corporation act. Id.
30. If the policy had expired, the defendant could not be held without alleging that the loss accrued before its expiration. If the policy was alive the
losses must have occurred while it was in force. Id.
31. A sale of decedent's property by the Orphans' Court is not such an
alienation as will avoid a policy. Farmers'Mut. Ins. Co. v. Graybill, .710.
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32. Suit on the policy should be in name of administrator to use of vendee,
where the sale was not confirmed before the loss. Fariers'Mat. ns. Co. v.
Graybill, 710.
33. In an action on a life policy where assured committed suici.le, it is not
error for the court to charge, " If the assured was not conscious of the act lie
was committing, but acted under an insane impulse, or if he was inicapable of
exercising his judgment in consequence of his reasoning powers being overthrown," the defendants are liable. Am. Life is.Co. v. Isett's Ad:,, , 711.
34. It is not error to refuse to charge, That if the assured was con-1iiis
that his death would follow the discharge of the pistol, there can he l, recovery, although he was laboring under mental depression or disturbance of
mind. Id.
35. An assignee of a policy takes it subject to all the equities which attach
to it in the hands of the assured. Johnson v. Phtenix Ins. ('o., 779.
36. If insurer assents to assignment, he cannot claim any set-off, in a suit
by the assignee, which he might have had against insured. Id.
INTEREST. See CONFEDERATE NOTES, 4; ESTOPPEL, 9 ; VENDOR AND PURCHASER,

I.

I. A vendee taking posessbon without paying purchase-money is bound to
pay interest. Parker v. Parker, 260.
2. Where allowed by way of damages must be according to the rate of the
lexfori. Goddardv. Foster, 330
INTERNAL POLICE.

See ALIEN, 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 52.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 20, 21.
1. The Act of 1872 imposes a penalty on every person who shall keep a place
where it is reputed that intoxicating liquors are kept for sale, without having
a license tierefor. Held to be sufficient that the place was reputed to be one
where intoxicating liquors were kept for sale, and not necessary that it he
reputed that they were kept for sale without a license. State v. Biurkley, 355.
2. In a prosecution under this act the accused claimed that the act was unconstitutional, and asked the court to charge the jury that they were judges
of the law as well as of the facts. The judge instructed the jury that in a
criminal case they were judges of the law as well as of the facts, hut that they
were under the same obligation in the matter with the judge on the bench,
and were not authorized to say that that is not law which is so; that the
Supreme Court had decided the act to be constitutional, and that in his opinion it was constitutional ; that if they decided that to le unconstitutional
which the Supreme Court had decided to be" constitutional, they would disturb the foundations of law ; but that, after all, they were judges of the law,
and if on their consciences they could say that the act was unconstitutional
they ought to acquit the accused. Held, on motion of the accused for a new
trial, that tile
charge was correct. Id.
3. By statute the jury are made the judges of the law in criminal cases, but
not in any such sense that they are at liberty to disregard the law. They are
to inquire what the law is, and where their judgment is satisfied, the law as
thus ascertained is binding upon them, and Should be their guide, whether
it is or is not as they may think it ought to be. Id.
JOINT LIABILITY.
1. In an action of tort against two or more, separ.ate acts not committed
with common purpose or in concert, will not authorize a joint recovery.
Leidig v. Bucher et al., 718.
2. Plaintiff may recover against the one concerned as if lie alone had been
sued. Id.
3. Defendants who have not conspired or joined in committing the wrong,
should not be joined in same action. Id.
JUDGMENT. See CONFEDERATE STATES, 1. PRoCEss, 2. WAY, 4.
1. May be assailed collaterally for fraud, by persons not parties or privies
to it.

Spicer et al. v. lVaters, 260.

2. Ajudgment is not a written instrument within the statutes requiring copies
in pleading. Brooks v. Harris, 262.
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3. A judgment without personal service on the defendant is not evidence of
his liability outside of the state authorizing it. Board of Public Works v.
Columbia college, 329.
4. Julgnient on a note or contract operates as a merger of it, and is a bar to
a second suit on the note. Eldred v. Bank, 330.
5. Where one of the defendants, in an action on a joint contract, dies before
judgment, and the judgment is taken against all the defendants, without any
.ugge.,tiou of his death, or making his representatives parties, such judgment
ik not void, but merely voidable, and is a determination of the action, within
the meaning of sections 218 and 219 of the code, authorizing an action by the
plaintilf in attachment against the garnishee. Swasey v. Antrin, 577.
6. A court hai power to correct a clerical error in entering its judgment.
Darning v. Burkhardt, 651.
7. A judgment must be considered as entered.during the term at which the
cause was tried. Id.
8. At a subsequent term though the court cannot review the judgment on
the merits, it may correct a mistake in entering it, so as to make it conform
to it. decision. 1d.
9. The court cannot vacateajudamentafter the term at which it was entered.
Scheer v. Keown, 711.
Ill.
It may set aside ajudgment at the same term. Id.
1I. It may amend a judgment so as to correct clerical errors or mistakes
of the clerk. Id.
12. It miy vacate at a subsequent term a void judgment. Id.
JURY. See CRIMINAL LAw, 6, 7. INSURANCE, 1. INTOXtCATING LiquoRS,
2, 3.
LACHES. See LEGAL TENDER NOTES, 2. TRUST AND TRUSTEE, 5, 11.
1. If ignorance of the fraud is relied on to excuse the delay of five years
in filing a bill to set aside judicial proceedings for fraud, it must be shown
specifically when the knowledge was first obtained. Rarwood v. Railroad,
329.
2. A court will not set aside the proceedings under which an improvement
has been made by a city where there has been laches in applying for relief.
Bald elal. v. City of Elizabeth, 391.
3. Undue delay in the tender of price, and rescission of a contract of sale,
would affirm it. Learning et al. v. Wise et al., 394.
4. When the facts are undisputed what is reasonable time or undue delay
is for the court. Id.
-4ANDLORD AND TENANT.
1. A landlord who removes his tenant during the term cannot plead in
justification of the trespass, that the house was used for a place of prostitution. Mfiller v. Forman, 394.
2. A tenant who goes into possession by parol permission of the landlord
without any agreement as to time or rent, cannot by the erection of buildings
and making repairs claim that his tenancy has become enlarged, by an implied liability to pay reasonable annual rent. Rich v. 13olton, 718.
3. Such tenancy lacked the essential element of annu itrent to make it a
tenancy from year to year. 1d.
4. Such tenant is not entitled to six months' notice to quit. Id.
LEGAL TENDER NOTES. See COVENANT, 5.
1. The taker of counterfeit coin, or paper-money which has been made
legal-tender by law, must use due diligence to ascertain its character and to
notify the giver, to entitle him to recover its value. Atwoodv. Cornwall, 231.
2. Any unnecessary delay beyond such reasonable time as would enable
the taker to inform himself as to its genuineness acts as a fraud on the giver
and prevents a recovery. Id.
3. Whether the rule, "that a party passing negotiable paper warrants its
genuinelies%" is applicable to paymuents made in coin or legal-tender notes.
Quere? Id.
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1. A broker cannot recover commissions unless he has taken out a license
under tile
Act of Congress of June 30th 1864. Halt v. Green, 453.
2. An action cannot he maintained in Pennsylvania founded on a violation
(fa United States law. Id.
3 There is no difference whether the contract is inaltin prohhimn or u1111a
in se, the test is whether plaintiff requires the illegal transaction to cstahli.h
his case. Id.
LIEN. See BANK AND BANK'R, 5, 7.
IUSBAND AND WIFE, 20. SIIPPING,
11, 13. STOCKEoLDRu,
2.
VENDOR AND I'UtIIASEItu, 6, 7, 8, 9.

LIMITATIONS.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW'V,6. HUSBAND AND WIFE, 40.
PARTNERsHIr, 1. TIME, 1.
1. Possession taken under a parol gift i. adverse in the donec against the
donor, and if continued for fifteen years pcrfect. the title of the donee as agmain.t
the donor. The donor in such case not only knows that tile possession is
adverse, but intends it to he so, and there is no occasion for any notoriety.
Notoriety is only important where the adverse character oif the posse-iolI i
Clark t ux. v. Gdhert,
to be brought home to the owner by presumption.
19.
2. The statute may be pleaded to an action for relief against frani ill the
Wallace v.
conveyance of land, as well as to an action to recover money.

Metzker, 195.
3. NULLUm TEatPus OCCURRIT REGI, 465.
4. Where the occupant of land claiming title under a sheriff's deed upon a
sale on execution, has been in possession for ten years, the original ownter is
barred by the statute. Nortli v. h1am,,er, 591.
5. The fact that the title was not divested by the sale, in consequence of
some defect in the proceedings, does not prevent the application of the statute. Id.

LIS PENDENS.
Is a good plea in abatement without showing actual vexatiousness.
v. Bay, 58.
LIVE-STOCK.

Ganisb,

Sea COMMON CARRIER, 1, 3.

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.
The advice of counsel who have been fully informed of the facts is a complete justification. Stanton v. Hart, 394.
MANDAMUS. See ATTORNEY, 7.
Against an officer of the government abates on his death or retirement
from office, his successor cannot be made a party. United States v. Boutwell,
330.
MARRIAGE.

See HUSBAND AND WIFE, I.

MASTER AND SERVANT. See INFANT, 3.
1. B., who was a carpenter, uas employed byiR. to go in a boat, upon a submerged lot owned by him ; and do certain work of his trade. While there at
work, a shot was fired from a house on an adjacent lot, which wounded B.,
hence his action for damages. It appeared that R. knew his possession of the
lot was resisted and a resort to arms was imminent at any moment. He did
not inform B of this fact, and the latter had no reanon to believe be was
going into danger when employed to do the work. held: R. was liable. The
risk B. legally agreed to take was such as was necessarily incident to his employment. A. could have relieved himself of responsibility by informing B.
of the facts of the danger. The concealment of facts, or the failure to state
them by employer to employee, which would tend to expose any hidden and
unusual danger to be encountered in the course of the employment, to a degree beyond that which the employment fairly imports, renders the employer
liable for injuries resulting therefrom to the employee. Baxter v. Roberts,
41.

2. A servant who wilfully neglects the orders of his master cannot. claim
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exemption against a party injured in consequence thireof.
rence. 396.

Homer v. Law-

MAXIMS.

Sec LIMITATION, 3.
Ix JURE NON IEMOTA CAUSA SED PROXIMA SPECTATUR, 14.

MERGER.

MINES.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 17.

See

CORPORATION, 10.

JUDGMENT, 4.

WATER AND WATERCOURSES.

MORrGAGE.

See ESTOPPEL, 6. GIFT, I. RAILROAD, 13. SHIPPING, 2.
TRUST AND "ITRUSTEE, 22, 23. USURY, 2.
I. Accretions, by growth of cuttings from plants mortgaged, pass to the
nlortgagee. Bryant V. Pennell, 125.
2. Equity will not enjoin a mortgace of chattels, tile mortgage being
given by n corporation to secure the debt incurred on a sale of tln,
chattels,
front seling them at tile instance of a stockholder. Amerman v. Wiles et a/.,
194.

3. Tile mortgage being executed by the president and secretary, who were
the owners of two-thirds of the .tock, complies with a statute requiring tile
written assent of two-thirds of tie stockioldlers. Id.
4. A sale of mortgaged premi-es in all other respect,; unobjectionable will
not e set aside for inadequacy of price. Horsey
1 v. flougl, 261.
5. The duties (f a mortgagee making a sale, are analogous to those of a
trustee, and tile court will determine upon the propriety of the sale. Id.
6. The right of a mortgagee under a power in the mortgage to sell the
mortgaged premises in case of default, is not impaired or suspended by the
war, on account of the voluntary residence of the mortgagor in the hostile section. Dgh'ervillev. Dejarnette, 318.
7. Notice required under a power of sale in a mortgage is not for the benefit of tile mortgagor in the sense of notice to him. It is only to secure his
right to a fair sale of the property. Id.
8. A mortgagee who assiens the mortgage and guarantees the debt is a
proper party to a suit to f reclose. Jarnan v. IVisevall, 331.
9. That the liability of the guarantor does not take effect until the remedy
against the mortgagor is exhausted is no objection to the jurisdiction of a
court of equity. Id.
10. Nor the fact that the guarantor is liable at law. Pd.
I1. Motion to amend final decree, to make it personal against guarantor,
refused where remedy at law complete. Id.
12. Where a conveyance is made as a security for a loan it is immaterial
what are the terms of the agreement, it will be considered in equity a mortgage. Danzeisen's Appeal, 394.
13. Where a bill charges that the defendant holds in trust for the plaintiff,
and the facts show that there was a mortgage, the Supreme Court will sustain
the hill to reach the justice of tile case, and disregard the use of inappropriate

terms. Id.
14. The assignee of a mortgage, holds it subject to all the equities to which
it was liable in the bands of the assignor, unless tile mortgagor has estopped
himself. Ashton's Appeal. 395.
15. The mortgagor having given a certificate of " no defence" cannot set
up one against an assignee. Id.
16. A subsequent assignee may avail himself of a certificate given to a
former, if lie shows that he is an assignee for value without notice. Id.'
17. A purchaser with notice of fraud or trust may protect himself under
a prior purchaser without notice. rd.
18. In a foreclosure suit the rights of an adverse title cannot be adjudicated.
Sinnzons v. Emerson et al., 523.
19. Sec. 5154 of Michigan laws, does not mean to give purchaser at fore-

closure sale the title, by barring the true owner. Id.
20. The purchaser must he left to try the hostile title in ejectment.

Id.

21. The holder of a mortgage, given on representations that turned out to
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be false, will notwithstanding be entitled to recover on it, on the ground that
there is a distinction recognised by the law between representations of exist.
ing facts, and a representation of facts yet to come into existence. Sawyer V.
Prickett and Ifrife, 711.
22. A stipulation in a mortgage given to secure a note, not to foreclose,
"until the maker's property is exhausted," is complied with, when after judgment on the note, it appears the maker has no property subject to execution.
leiblt v. Davis, 779.
23. In the absence of fraud a judgment-creditor whose execution has been
set aside, whereby the goods were lost to him, may recover the whole amount
of his debt from a co-surety of the debtor. Id.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.

See

NEGLIGENCE,

20.

SIDEWALK,

2, 3.

STREETS, 5, 6.

1. Equity will not restrain a city from assessing the property-owners for
the cost of paving a street on the ground that it was not done in accordance
with the contract. Leibenstein v. City of N~ework, 59.
2. Equity will not yestrain erroneous assessment unless it will cause irreparable injury or lead to multiplicity of suits. Id.
3. That it would deprive complainant of his property is not an irreparable
injury. Id.
4. If the corporation in making streets is to be regarded as the agent of the
landowners, they must bear the consequence of its negligence. Id.
5. If landowners permit the city to pay the contractors they can have no
relief against the-assessment. fd.
6. Courts will not disturb municipal bodies in the exercise of their police
powers, when they are exercised for the general welfare. |Veil v. Ricord et
al., 60.
7. The Board of Health cannot absolutely prohibit the carrying on of a
lawful business not necessarily a nuisance. Yd.
8. A grant of special powers to a corporation will not be enlarged by intendment. Id.
9. Municipal authorities have power to bind property-owners for street improvemnents, but the owners are entitled to have the contracts performed substantially according to their terms. Schunini v. Seymour. 331.
10. Equity will restrain the authorities if they'are about to pay for what is
not done according to the contract. Id.
11. If the property-owners stanl by and see the contractor paid, they can
have no relief against the assessment made upon them. Id.
12. In the exercise of legislative or discretionary powers municipal corporations are bevond the control of the courts. Pd.
13. In the payments of contracts with the property-owners' noney they act
as agents and are amenable. Id.
14. The affairs of a corporate body can be transacted only at a corporate
meeting. Their only existence is as a board and they can do no act except
as a board. Id.
15. Public policy requires restrictive enactments to be rigidly enforced. rd.
16. It is a fundamental principle of law thaall persons contracting with a
municipal corporation must at their peril see that the officers have power to
make the contract.
d.
17. The Legislature has full power to authorize the laying of railways in
the streets of a city. Paterson 4- Passaic Railroad v. liagor of Paterson et
al., 333.
18. The grant of such authority, even without the consent of the property
owners along the route, is lawful. Id.
19. Where such consent is required. the knowledge of the property-owners
that the road is being constructed, andl their failure to object while the work
is being done, will be deemed evidence of consent. Id.
20. The city is to he deemed the owner of an open square for the purpose
of giving consent. Id.
21. A contractor under proposals for street improvements must be held to his
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bid, if he receives more it is an illegal charge against the landowners. .T. M.
Board etat. v. City of Hoboken, 395.
22. It must be clearly shown that injustice has been done before an assessment made by commissioners for street improvements will be set aside upon
the facts. Pudney et al. v. Villge of Passaic, 395.
23. There is no rule condemning assessments by the lineal feet of frontage.
d.
24. In all matters of general concern, such as taxation, or the suppressing
of insurrections, municipal corporations have no local right to act, independent
of the state. Park Commissioners v. Common Council, 524.
25. In objects and purposes peciuliarly local, the state is no more concerned
Id.
than in the private concerns of its citizens.
26. It is a fundamental principle in Michigan, that the people of every
town and city are entitled to the benefits of local self-government. lId.
27. As to property held for its own private purposes a city is to be regarded
as a natural person and entitled to the like protection. id.
28. The constitutional principle that no person shall be deprived of property
without due process of law, applies to artificial as well as natural persons and
to municipal corporations. Id.
29. The state cannot take, by any process of taxation, the money of an
individual citizen, for purpo-es of local conveniences. Id.
30. Where a town issues bonds to which coupons are attached and acknowledges in the bond that the town is indebted to bearer it may be sued on the
coupons alone. Town of Qaueen.,bury v. Culver, 652.
31. The liability of the town is not taken away by the fact that the legislature has directed a special mode of raising the money to pay the bonds and
interest Id.
32 Where the charter of a city declares that when the grade of a street is
chanqed, all damage s.hall be paid by the city, the right to such damage is
pur,.q statutory. Studler v. Milwaukee, 652.
33. Damages can only be recovered for injuries to the land or building
itself, anti not fbr injury to the trade carried on upon the premises. Id.
34. Where the charter of a city authorizes councils to improve a street at
expense of lot-owners, only upon presentation of a petition signed by a certain
proportion of such owners, the presentation of such petition is essential to
give councils jurisdiction. Caqfiehl v. Smith, 780.
35 Where the improvement was made without such petition, a lot-owner
whose property was sold for non-payment of the assessment, may set aside
the sale. Id.
36. A lot owner will not he estopped from alleging want of power in the
councils, because having notice that the work was ordered, he did not interId.
pose until it was done.
NAME.

See COVENANT, 9.

EVIDENCE, 10, 12.

NATURALIZATION.
Certificates of naturalization are records and cannot be impeached collaterally. Scott v. .Strobach. 461.
NAVIGATION.

See NvISANCE. 6.

RIPARIAN OwNER, 7, 8.

i. The right of navigation is not so far paramount as to make booming
they encroach on navigable waters. Brig Cit9
facilities a nuisance whenever
395.
of Erie v. Ctalfiels,
2. An injury to a boom is not a maritime tort and cannot be redressed in
admiralty. Id.

NEGLIGENCE. See RAILROAD. 9.
1. Where n party charters a tow-hoat for the season, the owners to furnish
the hands anti pity expenses, for a round stm; he will not e responsible for
damage to a tow, caused by negligence of the hands. Bissel v Torre.l, 60.
2. A party erecting a brewery in the populous part of a city, will be held
to a higher degree of care and diligence, to prevent injury to surrounding
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property, by the construction and management of the chimneys and flues, than
if it was located in the country. Gagg v. Vetter, 196.
3. The want of care or skill in the selection !of the best plans for the construction of the chimneys, will be deemed negligence and render him liable
for injuries resulting therefrom. Id.
4. The question or negligence is one of mingled law and fact, and when the
facts are undisputed to be deciled by the court. id.
5. A complaint against a railroad torecover for negligence must distinctly
allege that the injury occurred without the fault or negligence of the plaintiff.
lfxfield v. C. J. 6- L. Railroad Co., 261.
6. Where the plaintiff has been guilty of. a plain act of carelessness which
has contributed to an accident, it is the duty of a court as matter of law, to
say that he cannot recover. Lewis v. Baltimore6- Ohio R. R., 284.
7. Plaintiff desiring to cross a street in Baltimore, after dark, the street
lamps being lighted, found a train of railroad cars blocking the crossing. A
crowd had collected waiting for an opportunity to cross, and while plaintiff
was waiting two women had been prevented by the police from creeping under
the couplings, but several persons had climbell up the platforms and thus
crossed. After waiting about five minutes p aintiff started to get on the
platform with the intention of crossing in the same manner, when the train
started and his leg was crushed between two cars. H4-1d, that such an act was
contributory negligence and he could not recover. Id.
8. he fitct that the railroad company was 'negligent in thuq blocking a
street crossing c,)ntrary to the city ordinances, did not relieve plaintiff from
the duty to use ordinary care to avoid danger. Id.
9. A party is not answerable in daccagei for the reasonable exercise of a
right unless upon proof of negligence, unskilfulness or malice. Phila. 4
Beading R. R. v. Yeger, 396.
10. Railroad not liable for buildings burned by sparks from an engine used
in the ordinary way. Id.
11. Actionable negligence exists only when a party whose negligence occasions the loss owes a duty from contract or otherwise to the party who
suffers. Kohl v. Love, 396.
12. A purchaser who relies on a tax receipt given by a collector of taxes
for the amount due in buying land, cannot maintain an action against the collector if he suffers a loss. Id.
13. A tax collector is not required to give certificates that property is discharged from taxes, and any one relying on his receipts does so at his peril.
Id.
14. If defendant's negligence is such that injury could not have been
avoided, plaintiff's negligence is immaterial, and is not properly speaking'
contributive. Daniels v. Cleqg, 459.
15. Age and sex should be consideredl in deciding the question of neglid.
gence.
16. It is such negligence for a passenger in a railroad car to allow his arm
to project out of the window, that if it is injured by coming in contact with
any external object he cannot recover, notwith. tanding the injury may have
been partly caused by the negligence of the company in permitting an obstacle
to be too near the track. P. 4- C. Roilroud v. Andrews, 566.
17. Where there is contributory negligence (in the part of the plaintiff he
cannot recover for injury. Pittsburg, F I. 4' C. Railway v. Krichbuuim's
Ad., 780.

18. A refusal so to charge is error for which judgment will lie reversed.
Id.
19. Negligence is the want of such care as men of ordinary prudence
woulil use in similar eircum-tances. lfayo,', 6-r. v. Holmes, 780.
20. In the absence of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff.
a municipal corporation is liable for injuries resulting from the obstruction of
a street. Id.
NEGRO.

See CIVIL RIGHTS.

COMrMON CARRIER, 10.

)AMAGES, 1.
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NEW TRIAL.
1. Where there is a conflict of testimony, and the facts if believed by the
jury would warrant the verdict, the court will not set it aside. Williams v.
Phtenix Ins. Co., 125."
2. Should not be granted on ground of newly discovered evidence, unless
its effect
ought to have resulted in a different verdict. Clereland R. R. Co. v.
Long, 781.
NOTICE. See BANK ANDi BANKER, 2. IBANKRUPTCY, 16. CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw,43, 44. HUSBAND .NI) WIE, 19.
MIORTGAGE, 17. STOCKHOLDERu,
1.

VErNOR AND PURCIIASER,

10.

1. A party who is hound to make inquiry will he affected with all the
knwl-d.,e he would have got by inquiry.
ordnra v. lod,
334.
2. It is not necessary that a proclamation (t the l're-ident should he publi-lhd, it takes effect when signed and sealed and attested. Lapeyre v.
United States, 334.
NUISANCE. See 'MUNICIPAL CORtORntTION, 7 RAILnOAI, 5.
1. Though the jurisdiction of equity to restrain puhlic nuisances is undoubted, it will not be exercised when the same ob~ject can he attained in the
ordinary tribunals. Attorney-General v. Brown, 60.
2. The remedy by indictment is so efficacious that equity interferes with
reluctance.
Id.
3. The obstruction of a highway which cannot he used is not such a grievanve a4 equity will redresi by injunction. Id.
4. Equity will reqtrain a threatened nuisance to a dwelling if the injury is

likely to materially dimini.-h the value of the property, and interfere with its
Adams Y. .
Michael, 197.
5. Such facts shouhl be stated in the hill as would enable the court to determine whether a nuisance would result, and not a simple allegation that
such would he the consequence. Id.
6. The rule that the obstruction of a navigable river will not be deemed a
nuisance if the public are bencfited, modified, by requiring the brnefit to he
direct, and to the puhliefreqaenting that port. Attnrny-General v. Tcrry, 59 1.
7. A business which is not a nuisance in itself, may become so, in view of
the neighborhood in which it is proposed to be carried on. Wier's Appeal, 715.
8. The legislature has recognised that the storing of gunpowder in thickly
settled places is a nuisance. Id.
9. There is a distinction between a business long-estnbliqhed, which has
become a nuisance from increase of population, and a new erection threatened
in such vicinity. I.
OFFICE AND OFFICER. See MANDAMUS. TRESPASS, 4.
An officer legally appointed and qualified. who continues to act after the
expiration of his term, in good faith, is not held to be criminally surping
the office within the meaning of Act of March 1831 of Ohio. Kreidlerv.
The State, 653.
PARKS. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 24, 25.
enjoyment.

PARTITION.
1. In partition, equity will not try the question ofcomplninant2s illegitimacy.
Rirerriew Cemetery Co. v. Turner, 198.
2. The mot it will do, is to retain the cause ex gratia until the complainant
settles his title at law. Id.
PARTNERSIIIIP. See EXECUTION, 4. HVsnAn AX) WtrFn.21. P ACTICE., I.
1. May he entered into with reference to a custom or nt~nge ot the place
where the business is to be conducted.
JITariny v. Giwfd,, 61.
2. Such custom will modifv the partnership agreement. hl
3. To protect a partner against it, the agreement must be so framed, or
the partner must give notice of his dissent. Id.
4. Where all the partners except one, nppear to a hill for an aectut and
allow it to be taken pro cnnfesso, the court will not dismiss the hill without
reference to a master, upon the general denial of indehtedness by the one,
however positive it may be. Lawrence v. Rokes, 126."
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PARTNERSHIP.
5. Though equity will ordinarily give full effect to the Statute of Limitations, relief will not he refused where peculiar circumstances appear to justify
a delay. L,,wrence v. Rokes, 126.
6. To operate as a bar the statute must be claimed in the answer. Id.
7. Whether actions of account or remedy by bill are subject to any other

than tle general limitation of twenty years. Quere? Id.
8. Where partners purchase real estate with the money of the firm as
partnership property, upon the settlement of the partnership business brought
about lay the death of one of the members of the firm, the proceeds o' the
sale of the interest of the deceased partner in such real estate is to be regarded as land remaining iii specie, after discharging its liabilities as partnership stock ;and the widow of such deceased partner is entitled to an interest
therein for her life only. Appeal of Belle D. Foster, 300.
9. On a bill by representatives of deceased partner against survivors, the
latter are only to be charged with such sum as the assets would bring with
reasonable care and diligence. AMoore v. Huntington, 334.
10. Nor are they to le charged with the real estate of the partnership
the title to which is left by the decree to the heirs of the deceased partner. Id.
11. The representativeb of a deceased partner have no right of possession
in partnership property. Pfeff'er v. Steiner, 461.
12. The right of action Jor any trespass to the property of the firm rests
solely in the survivor. Id.
13. A partnership claim is not liable for the sole debt of one of the firm,
although the party owing the claim was not aware of there being a partnership when lie incurred it. Bartlett v. Voodward, 708.
PARTY-WALL.
Equity will not decree a party-wall to be taken down if it projects slightly
over complainant's land and lie was aware of it while it was building. Mlayer's Appeal, 396.
The complainant has his right to damages. Id.
PASSENGER. See COMMON CARRIER, 7,8. NEGLIGENCE, 16. RAILROAD, 14.
15. SALVAGE, 1, 2.
PAYMENT.

See ACTION, 7.

PLEADING, 3.

I. Where a payment is made by the notes of a third person who had become insolvent, the creditor may return them if the fact of insolvency was
unknown at the time. Roberts v. Fisher, 261.
2. Such is the law in the case of bank-bills and the same should apply to
notes.
d.
3. To an officer presenting a writ is made under legal compulsion, and is
not deemed voluhtary. McKee v. Campbell, 399.
PHYSICIAN.

See EVtDENCE, 51.

RAILROAD, 10.

PILOTAGE.
1. An Act of Assembly provides that licensed vessels failing to take a pilot
shall pay half pilotaqe, one not licensed full pilotage-" and all half pilotage
forfeitures and penalties in nature thereof aceruina under the act shall be recovered for the society for relief of pilot'." Held that a forfeiture o.fall pilotage was for the use of the society. Collins v. Soc.for Relief f Pilots 462.
2. The appropriation of the penalty is not part of the.penal provision and
must lie contrued reasonably. Id.
3. The penalty not being a tax its appropriation to a private corporation is
constitutional. Id.
4. Imposing pilotage on vessels in foreign commerce, anl half pilotage on
coasters, is not in conflict with sect. 10 of Art. 1 of Constitution of United
States. ld.
PLEADING. See ACTION, 10, 13. AMENDMENT, 2. ' CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
18.

INsURANCE, 29.

NEGLIGENCE, 5.

PRACTICE, 2, 11.

TRESPASS, 6.

1. A complaint for flowage containing no allegation of defendant's ownership of the land is bad on demurrer. .fones V. Skinner, 126.

INDEX.
PLEADING.
2. In Maine an unaccepted bill is no evidence of payment of the original debt,
hence i new count may be added to a declaration on the bill, declaring on
the debt, by way of amendment. Strang v. Hirst, 126.
3. A promissory note or accepted bill, however, is prlrnd facie evidence of
payment of debt. Id.
4. " Fraudulently" in a declaration implies a scienter, and is argumentative, but if not objected to is cured by verdict. Beebe v. Knapp et al., 457.
5. Where an issue of fact not raised by the pleadings was distinctly .uhmitred to the jury without objection, the admission of evidence to sustain sullh
fact is not error, and the pleadings may be amended to conform to the I1wL
proved. MfcCord v. McSpaden, 705.
6. Where one count in a declaration is for so negligently conducting locomotives and cars that plaintiff's timber was burned by sparks, and. the second
count was for not maintaining fences between railroad and plaintiff's land
whereby plaintiff suffered, both counts being in tort, were properly joined.
P. IV. 4- B. R. R. Co. v. Consle, 784.
POWERS. See TRUST AND TRUSTEE, 18, 22, 23.
PRACTICE. See ACTION, 12. CERTIORARI, 1. COxMON CARRIER, 14. EvIDEFNCE. 2.

1. Action must be in name of survivors, where one of the partners is dead,
for debt due partnership. Straung v. Hirst, 126.
2. Objection to plaintiff's maintaining suit as surviving partner must be
taken in abatement. Id.
3. The statement under the R. S. of Maine is a substitute for a special
plea and may he bad for duplicity. Id.
4. Where a case has gone to decree in state court, it is too late to remove
it to the Federal courts. Kingsbur.y v. Kingsbury. 127.
5. The removal can only be made by application of defendant on entering
his appearance. id.
6. A minor cannot consent to change of forum. Id.
7. A voluntary appearance cures any irregularity in the service of process.
Carpentierv. .finturn et al., 253.
8. No objection can be made to jurisdiction after a general appearance. Id.
9. A party who objects to the admissibility of evidence cannot be heard to
object to its withdrawal from the jury. Sittig v. Birkestack, 263.
10. The court has the power at any time during trial to modify its instructions to the jury. Id.
11. Where the endorsee of an inland bill sies the drawer in the Circuit
Court, it is not enough to allege that the plaintiff is a citizen of one state
and the defendant of another. Morgan's Executor v. Gay, 655.
PROCESS.
1. A return to a summons that defendant was served personally is sufficient without stating that it was in the county. Knowles v. Gas-Light 4- Coke
Co., 591.
2. In an action on a judgment of another state, the defendant may show
that he was not served, notwithstanding that the record shows that he was.
it/.
RAILROAD. See CIvIL RIGHTS. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 36, 51. EQUITY,
5.
FENCES, 1, 2.
M1UNICIPAL CORPORATION, 17.
NEGLIGENCE, 7, 8, 10,
16.

TORT, 2.

1. REGULATION OF INTERSTATE TRAFFIC ON RAILROADS BY CONGRESS, 1.
2. To render a railroad liable, under the statute of Indiana, for animals
killed, the killing must be the result of direct collision. 0. 4- if. Railway
Co. v. Cole, 198.
3. The company is not liable for injuries resulting from fright. Id.
4. The legislature may authorize building a railroad on a public road.
Danville Railroad Co. v. Commonwealth, 397.
5. A railroad obstructing travel on the portion of a public road allowed by
law, is not gitilty of nuisance. Id.
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RAILROADS.
6. Where party killed by railroad was guilty of negligence, his family cannot recover damages. Penna. R2. R, Co. v. Beale, 526.
7. The duty of traveller to stop is more obligatory where train cannot be
seen. Id.
8. If the track cannot be seen from carriage, he should get out and lead his
horse. Id.
9. Failure to stop before crossing track is negligence per se. Id.
10. A superintendent cannot employ a physician to attend an employee who
has been injured by railroad company's locomotive, and bind the company.
Marquette H. 6- 0. R. R. Co. v. Tuft, 527.
11. The power to purchase lands conferred upon a railroad company by the
Act of February 1848 of Ohio, is not limited to the acquisition of such as
are necessary for operating the road. Walsh v. Burton, 654.
12. If the company abuses its power, still, after resale and conveyance the
title of the vendee is indefeasible. Id.
13. A mortgage on the road " whether made or to be made," is not a lien
upon real estate of the company which has not been used for operating the
road. Id.
14. Plaintiff being invited by the conductor got into the caboose of a coal
train and rode without paying any fare. An accident occurred through the
negligence of the conductor, whereby plaintiff was injured. Held, the relation of carrier and passenger had not been created, and the company was not
liable. Eaton v. D. 6- L. W. R. R. Co., 665.
15. Where a railroad company has divided its business between passenger
and freight trains, the conductor of the latter, though called by the same name.
has not the powers of a conductor in regard to passengers. Notice of his
want of power will be implied from the nature and apparent division of the
business, and a person claiming to be a passenger on such train has the burden of proof of circumstances to except him from the general presumption.
Per DwIGUT, Commissioner. Id.
16. In an action against a railroad for setting fire to plaintiff's timber,
under the Code of Maryland, plaintiff may shov that defendant's engines had
occasioned frequent fires by scattering sparks, thereby proving negligence in
their construction and management. Aaaupolis 4-E. Railroad Co. v. Gaultt,
781.
17. The onus is on the defendant to show that it has used reasonable care
to pr.:vent injury from fire. -Ird.
18. The liability of railroads under the Code, for injuries from fires, extends
to all the near and natural consequences of their wrongful act, but not to
remote nor incidental. Id.
REAL ESTATE.
RECEIPT.

See CORPORATION, 1.

See EVIDENCE, 15, 16, 24.

PARTtNERSHIP, 8.
NEGLIGENCE, 12.

!. A receipt for bonds which describes them by their numbers and amounts,
and states that, "These bonds are held subject to the order of .. L. P. at ten
days' notice," makes it the signer's duty to return the same bonds. Palmer v.
Hussey, 262.
2. A refusal to return on demand is a conversion. Id.
RECEIVER.

See BANK AND BANKER, 3,

1. Where property is legally in possession of a receiver appointed by tile
court, the court must protect his possession not only against violence, hut
against suits at law. Matter of Day, on Complaint of Benson. 782.
2. If receiver is in posse.,sion of articles belonging to another, tim remedy
of latter is by application for redress to the court, he cannot take them and
convert to his own use. Id.
3. If owner takes them from receiver's possession lie is guilty of a contempt. Id.
4. Receiver's title cannot be tried in a proceeding by him for contempt. Id.
5. A final order in a proceeding for contempt is appealable. Id.
RECONSTRUCTION.

See Tixz, 5.

INDEX.

831

RECORD. See CONFEDERATE STATES, 3.
The opinion of the court below anti
the facts in it are not part of the record
and cannot be considered in the Supreme Court.

RELEASE.

Bartolett v. Dixon, 389.

See TRUST AND TRUSTEE, 2.

IES ADJUDICATA.
1. Judgment in a suit upon joint and several note in favor of one surety
will not bar suit against another, unless the defence in first, was an extinguishinent of cause of action or the defences are identical. Hill v. Morse,
257.
2. Though a former suit may not operate strictly as res adjudicata, yet it
may be referred to as an element by which a conclusion in accordance with
its result may be assisted. Htame v. Beale's Executrix, 329.
3. In an action for the keep of a horse, the defendant showed that he had
previously recovered judgment against the plaintiffs for the use of his horse
while it was being kept by them. The presumption was that the damages
had been assessed in the first action on the basis of allowing the claim for the
keep of the horse. and the claim was merged. Bends v. Jenninqs, 710.
4. A judgment for the full amount of the contract price fordigging a cellar
is no bar to a subsequent recovery of damages for breach of contract in not
having done it within specified time. Davenport v. Hubbard, 777.
RIPARIAN OWNER.
1. The owners of an tipper mill, whose business required the running of
their mill only by day, detained the water of the stream during the night,
such detention and the larger discharge during the day causing serious damage
to the owners of a lower mill, whose business required the running of their
mill both night anclday. The lower privilege was occupied several years before
the tipper, anti after the upper mill was built the water was for several years
allowed to flow during the night, and the lower mill had used it by night and
by day. Upon a petition by the lower mill-owners against the upper, for an
injunction against the detention of the water by night, it was held,
(I.) That the petitioners had acquired no superior rights bytheir earlier occupation, or by their use of the water by night, so long as they had exercised
no rigltq greater than such a- belong to them as riparian proprietors ; the
full flow of the stream being nothing beyond such right.
(2.) That all that the petitioners were entitled to was a reasonable use of
the stream against an unreasonable use or detention by the respondents ; that
the question was whether the respondents had acted unreasonably in detaining
the water ; and that the burden of proof on this subject was on the petitioners.
Keeney v. Union Maauifacturinq Uo., 82.
2. The right in such a case of the upper mill-owner to make the stream
useful to him by detaining the water during the night, is of the same quality
as the right of the lower mill-owner to take the benefit of the constant flow.
In deciding between these conflicting rights, there are to hd considered : 1.
The custom of the country as to the running of mills. 2. The local custom,
if there be one. 3. What general rule will best secure the entire stream to
useful purposes. 4. Whether the detention of the water is necessarily an injury to the lower mill, and whether the apparent injury is not causel by the
insufficienev of its own privilege. Id.
3. The maxim "aqua cnrrit et currere debet" is applicable rather to the
matter of the diversion of a stream and to the ordinary rights of' riparian
proprietors as such, than to the case of mill-owners, who have a right to
make a reasonable detention of the water by dams for the purposes of their
mills. Il.
4. The side boundaries of water-lots are to be governed by the course of
the stream and drawn at right angles with the central thread. 'Bay City GasLight Co. v. Industrial J[rocks,
526.
5. There is no distinction between streams that are subject to easement of
passage and those that are not. Id.
6. Any use of land under rivers compatible with the public easement
belongs with the upland. Id.
7. Even the beds of navigable tide-waters are subject to the disposal of
state laws saving the public rights. Id.
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RIPARIAN OWNER.
8. The right of docking must not impair the right of navigation. Bay
City Gas-Light Co. v. Industrial Works, 526.
9. Dock lines have nothing to do with boundaries.
Id.
10. Riparian owner may drain into an adjoining stream. Treat v. Bates,
527.
11. May prevent any interference with natural flow of stream as will injure his legal privileges. Id.
ROAD.
1. The Act of April 1846 of Pennsylvania vacating private roads by piescription is constitutional. Krier's Private fioad, 397.
2. Rbads by prescription rest upon adverse use for twenty years, and not
on the fiction of a grant. Id.
SALE. See INSURANCE, 31. MORTGAGE, 4. TRESPASS, 5. VENDOR ANt)
PURCHASER, 15, 25.

1. It is a question for the jury to determine whether the title to property
passed at time of sale, where the vendor agreed to haul the goods to a certain
place. Dyer v. Libby, 127.
2. If goods are unmistakably designated, delivery is not absolutely essential to complete the sale. Lingham 4- O.,borno v. Eggleston, 462.
3. Whether a sale is complete must be determined from the construction of
the agreement. Id.
4. Delivery is almost conclusive evidence that the property shall vest in
purchaser. Id.
5. Property may pass though something remains to be done by vendor.
1d.
6. Where. price depends on quantity or quality, whatever remains for vendor to do, as weighing, testing, &c., is a condition precedent to transference
of title. Id.
7. Where the transfer of possession corresponds with the nature of the
chattels sold, the sale is valid. Mc3farlan v. Enylish, 716.
8. Where there has -been actual change of possession the court cannot pronounce sale fraudulent in law. Id.
9. The separation from the vendor must be at the time of the sale. Id.
SALVAGE.
1. The rule of maritime law that a passenger who has no opportunity to
leave a vessel in distress, cannot render a salvage service, may admit of a qualified exception where he has promoted her safety by an extraordinary and
peculiar service which he was not compellable to render. But in admitting
such an exception in favor of a passenger, the greatest caution is necessary,

and especially so where he is of the nautical profession.
561.

The Pennsylvania,

2. Where a passenger of the nautical profession who has rendered such

service, afterwards assumed and exercised illegitimate authority over the vessel,
though the circumstances were not such that he incurred an ahsolute firfeiture
of the salvage compensation, its amount was nevertheless materially reduced

by reason of such usurpation of authority.
SCHOOL.

Id.

See INFANT, 6.

It is the duty of a school teacher to maintain discipline in the school, and
to do this he may expel a scholar. Scott v. School District N'o. 2 in bhittix,
716.

SET-OFF. See BILLS AND NOTES, 1. INSURANCE, 16, 36. STOCk, 2
1. A non-negotiable note payable on demand was executed to F. by the
defendant. Fourteen years later the note was t ransferred and delivered b y F.
to the plaintiff in part payment of a debt, and the plaintiff brought suit in his
own name thereon under the statute authorizing a suit so to be brought. At
the time the plaintiff took the note of F. the derendant had for several years
had a claim on book against F. greater than the note. The plaintiff knew
this and had shortly before been present at a meeting of F. and the defendant
at which they had attempted to adjust their mutual claims, and at which F.
had told him that he intended to apply the note in part payment of his indebt-
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SET-OFF.
edness to the defendant. He also knew that the defendant expected suhc
application to be made. The application however was not actually made at
tie time. the parties separating without having agreed as to the exact balance
Icue. Whether tlte deleidant could set off his claim against the note in the
suit: Quere. Tile authorities both English and American are in conflict and
confuion upon the point. -Vitch v. Gates, 28.
2. Whether or not such set-off could be made in an ordinary case, vet here
the plaintiff mut be regarded is having taken the note with full knowledge
of ait untderstanding of the parties that it should be applied upon the book
accout of tile plaitiff, and therefore as having taken it subject to the right
of tile defendant to make the set-off. Id.
3. It was not fbund in terms that F. was insolvent at the time the set-off was
sought to he made, but it appeared that the defendant had obtained judgment
sgaitt't F. more than a year befbre for the amount, that the debt had then
been of several years' standing, and that the execution obtained upon the judgment had never been collected. Held, that it might reasonably be inferred
that F. had not the means of payment or that they were beyond the reach of
legal proce-s. Id.
4. "1lie factof judgments being in different courts does not prevent their
being set off against each other. Brooks v. Harris,262.
5. There must be mutuality in claims in order that they may be set-off.
Id.
6. One judgment may be set off against another though the equitable title
to the former is in a stranger. Id.
7. A claim by the United Strtes for bonds unlawfully procured from it, is
sufficiently liquidated to be the subject of set-off. Allen v. United States, 335.
SHERIFF. See TRESPASS, 1.
I. A sheriff is a quasi bailee of property seized by him under process, and
only bound to use such care and diligence as a bailee for compensation. Pripe
v. Stone, 61.
2. An attorney issuing an execution is liable to the sheriff for his poundage
thereon. Carapbellv. Collison, 198.
3. But not on the amount the judgment has been reduced by the court since
the execution issued. Id.
SHERIFF'S SALE. See TRUST AND TRUSTEE, 15.
1. Will be set aside where there is gross inadequacy of price, and owner
has been prevented by mistake from attending it. Metzler v. Sharrtaann, 198.
2. One who contributes to such mistake even innocently cannot be permitted
to take advantage of it. Id.
SHIPPING. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 37. NEGLIGENOE, I. PILOTAGE,
I. SALVAGE, 1.
I. The presumption is that advances made to a captain in a foreign port to
pay for necessary repairs or supplies were made upon the credit of the vessel.
The Etnl.q Seuder, 335.
2. Liens for such advances have priority of existing mortgages. I'd.
3. General average extends to the loss of the ship when the cargois .Eved,
and the loss of the cargo when the ship is saved. McLoon's Adainistrator v.
Cunmming.qs, 398.
4. When the cargo is sent to the port of destination the parties are bound
by an adjustment made there. Id.
5. This rule does not obtain in case of fraud or mistake or when the voyage
is broken up and ended. Id.
6. Where a deviation is justified in case of disaster by a peril of the seadisabling the vessel from proceeding, the master becomes the agent of all the
parties in interest. 1d.
7. If the vessel cannot proceed it is the duty of master to reship the cargo
to port of destination. Id.
8. If master can save part of the freight he will be considered the owner's as
well as the shipper's agent, if he cannot he will be shipper's agent alone. Id.
9. If the master pays a premium for gold drafts to pay the expenses, in a
VOL. XXII.-54
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SHERIFFsuit to recover the shipper's share the verdict Must be for amount in gold, and
not for the premium paid. McMoon's Adm;nfstrator v. Cuminings, 398.
* 10. If freight and charges at port of destination consume the value of the
cargo, there is nothing upon which to charge the general average. Id.
11. The existence or non-existence of a maritime lien for repairs is wholly
independent of the port in which the repairs are made. T'1iqlor v. Steamuboat
Commonwealth, 502.
12. In a foreign port, a party making repairs or furnishing supplies to a
vessel is presumed to rely upon the credit of the vessel itself; hut at tile home
port such a presumption does not exist, and it must appear affirmatively that
the repairs were made or the supplies furnished on the credit of the vessel
and not on the credit of the owners. Id.
13. If the owners at the home-port are in good cre-lit, no maritime lien is
created. Id.
14. At a foreign port the master is only authorized to have such repairs made
as will enable the vessel to pursue her voyage. At the home-port, the owners
are not thus restricted. Id.
SIDEWALK. See HIGHWAY, 21. STREETS, 3.
1. The mere slippery condition of a sidew~alk arising from the ordinary
action of the elements (as snow and ice) is n~t a defect which renders a town
liable under the statutes of Wisconsin. Perkins v. Cityl of Fond du Lac, 715.
2. The liability of a city for injuries resulting from a defective sidewalk is
no longer open for discussion. Colby et ux. v. City of Beaver Dam, 778.
3. City is bound to repair any defect which endangers the safety of travellers. Id.
4. Where defect has existed for any length of time the city is presumed to
have had knowledge of it. id.
SLANDER.
1. It is not competent in slander to prove by the opinion of witnesses that
words spoken in the third person were spoken of plaintiff. McCue v. Feryuson, 527.

2. When the words are in second person it is a question of fact to whom
they
were addressed. Id.
- 3. A withdrawal of a plea of justification,
is no evidence of contradiction
of the statement, "that plaintiff had not said that the words were true." Id.
SLAVE. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 10.
SNOW.

See HIGHWAY, 20.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
1. Will not be decreed against a vendor whose wife refuses to join in the
deed. Reisz's Appeal, 527.
2. No abatement in the price would be just to both parties. Id.
3. The burden of showing title in himself, rests on the vendor who brings
a bill for specific performance against a vendee denying the sufficiency of his
title. Walsh v. Barton, 655.
4. A recent deed to vendor is not sufficient. Ad.
5. A vendee is not compelled to perform his agreement if the property is
subject to a judgment lien. Id.
STAMP.
1. Assignment of mortgage not stamped is not void unless omitted with
intent to defraud. Dela v. Stanwood, 127.
2. The stamp on the deed is the same whether the consideration be paid in
gold or United States notes. Ball v. Jordan, 717.
3. Where suit is brought on an instrumen~t requiring a stamp unler the
Act of July 13th 1866, and there is no evilence that plaintiff omitted the
stamp with intent to evade the act, the instrument may be used in evidence.
Black v. Richardson, 783.
STATUTES. See ATTORNEY, 1. BANKRUPTCT, 40. COURTS, 14.
1. A statute may be good in part and bad in parr, and when it is divisible the good part will be sustained. Lowndes Co. v. h1unter, 53.
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2. If matter foreign to the title is introduced into the statute hut is divisible from that which falls within the title the former only is void. Lowndes
Co. V. Hunter, 53.
3. Where a statute creates a claim against a county but provides no remedy,
a suit by summons and complaint is the proper one. Id.
4. When a local statute contains provisions which apply to the whole state,
it is valid though the title does not refer to them. The Pup'e exr rd. Akin
v. Morgan, 62.
5. It is otherwise where a public statute contains provisions of a private
nature not disclosed in the title. Id.
6. The law does not favor the repeal of statutes by implication. Waterworks Co. v. Burkhart, 262.
7. Where a statute is re-enacted after a construction given to it by the coin missioners of Internal Revenue, it is not to be deemed a legislative adoption
of such construction. Savings Bak v. United States, 717.
8. The repeal of a statute by implication is not favored. Somerset and
Stoystnwon Road, 717.
9. A subsequent affirmative statute is a repeal of a former as to the same
matter if it introduces a new rule and is intended as a sub-titute. Id.
10. If two acts provide remedies differing only in form, for the same
grievance, the latter is a constructive repeal of the first. Montel v. Consolidation Coal Co., 783.
STOCK.

See BANK AND BANKER, 12.

BOND.

1. The capital stock of a corporation is a trust fund for the benefit of the
general creditors, and they have a right to actual payment of stock subscriptions. Sawtger v. Hong, 327.
2. A stockholder indebted to an insolvent corporation for unpaid .hares
cannot set off a debt due him by the corporation. Pd.
3. Stock in a corporation is the indivilual property of the owner, which
he may sell or dispose of; like any other property, as he may see proper ; and
the president and directors have no control, power or dominion over it. ant
no duty to perform in reference to its sale, unless it be to see that proper
books and facilities are furnished for its transfer. Commissioners v. Reynolds, 376.
4. In the purchase of stock by a director or president of a corporation
from a stockholder, the relation of trustee and cestui que trust does not exist
between them. Id.
STOCKHOLDER.
1. A stockholder represented by proxy is presumed to have notice of all
proceedings during such representation. Thani v. Central Cit.y Ins. Co., 54.
2. There is no lien at common law in favor of a corporation against its
stockholders for debts due by them. Maut. In.. Co. v. Cullom, 54.
3. But where the charter provides for such lien it will embrace a general
debt contracted with the corporation. Id.
STREETS. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 1, 2, 9, 21, 34. NEGLIGENCE, 20.
1. A statute authorizing the expense of paving the road-bed of a city street
to be assessed in the proportion of two-thirds on the property abutting on the
street and the remaining third on the public at large, is unconstitutional.
Mfa.yor of Newark v. State, 441.
2. As ecsments for local improvements of this character may be made
against the property peculiarly benefited, but such assessment must be made
to the extent only of such peculiar benefits. Id.
S. This rule does not apply to improvements of the sidewalk, which is to
be regarded as subservient to the premises to which it is attached and the
expense of improving which may he charged wholly to the owner. id.
4. A statute directing a municipal corporation to have a street paved at the
expense of the property-owners, and thereafter to keep it in repair at the expense of the city, is not a contract with the property-owners, and the legislature may direct a repaving at their expense. Id.
5. A municipal corporation has a right to raise its streets and bridge them.
Allentown v. Kramer, 527.
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6. A municipality exercising its lawful authority is not liable for collateral
injuries. Allentown v. Kramer, 527.
7. It is liable for negligence in construction or repair of public works. Id.
SUMMONS.
SUNDAY.

Sec I'RocEss, 1.
See BILLS AND NOTES, 28, 30.

1. The defendant hired a horse of the plaintiff on Sunday to go on that day
to the town of S. lie went several miles beyonid, and while doing so cau-cd
the death of the horse by overdriving. leld, in an action of trover joiid
with case, that the plaintiff could recover, notwithstanding the statute prohibition of all secular business on Sunday. Frot v.Plund, 537.
2. And it seems that he could equally recover for an injniy to the horse 1,y
the wrongful act of the defendant, within the limits for which he was hired.
Id.
3. The distinction is between wrongful acts which constitute a mere breach
of the contract, requiring on the part of the plaintiff the proof of the Contract
as an essential part of his case, and wrongftul acts that are independent of
the contract ant toward which the contract stands in a mere incidental relation. Id.
4. Although Sunday is dies non juridicus at the common law, and although
the statute of Illinois prohibits all secular employment on that day, yet in special cases where pulhic policy or the prevention of irremediable wrong requires
it, the courts may sit on that day and issue process. Langaber v. AJirbttry
R. R. Co., 747.
5. An injunction issued on Sunday to prevent a railroad company from
taking possession of a public street in a town, without having ndtile compensation to property-owners who would be injtired thereby, sustained. Id.
SURETY. See B iNK AND BANKEI, 9. BILLS AND NOTES, 8. MORTGAGE,
23. TRUST AND TRUSTEE, 24.
1. Where one of several parties signinga note is the real principal, the rest
are primndfzeie sureties, anti the burden of proof is on the party alleging contrary. Flanagan v. Post, 62.
2. A security from principal to surety enures for benefit of co-surety. Id.
3. Representations made to a surety on the faith of which he signs a note,
will not affect a co-surety unless he had knowledge of them. Id.
4. If surety gives his notes, to be in full satisfaction of original debt, when
paid, the principal is not discharged, if part of notes only are paid. Emn-'y
v. Richardson, 127.
5. Surety upon satisfying debt, is entitled to all the securities either legal
or equitable which creditor has, and if he parts with any the surety is exonerated to the extent he may be prejudiced thereby. Freanerv. Yingling, 199.
6. Creditor cannot be compelled to resort to principal debtor before proceeding against surety Id.
7. One who has been discharged from his primary liability, may still be
held to contribute in favor of co-surety. Hill v. Morse, 257.
8. RIGHTS OF SURETIES INTER SESE, 529.

9. When a debtor tenders payment of a debt for which a surety is bound
and the creditor declines to receive it, the surety is discharged. Joslyn v.
Eastman, 783.
TAXATION.

See ALIEN, 5. BANK AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 25, 26, 30, 34.

BANKER,
fUNC

13.

CERTIORARI,

10.

PAL CORPORATION, 29.

1. A tax-payer having no other interest cannot maintain bill in equity
against the public authorities to prevent acts claimed as illegal. Tifft v. City
of Bu talo, 127.
2. But if he sustains some specific injury he may maintain an action in
his o;Wn name. The People ex rel. Akin v. 1forgan, 128.
3. A tax on "bowling alleys," and on venders of merchandise, and all
other places of business or amusement, does not authorize a tax on merchants,
bankers and brewers. Butler's Appeal, 522.
4. "Other places of amusement" must be of the kind specifically designated. Id.
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5. A profit upon the capital passed to the stockholders is the measure
of the state tax on dividends. Coin. v. P., F. W. 4-0. Railway Co., 717.
6. If a dividend is declared the stock is taxable whether the dividend be
earned or not. rd.
stock7. A nominal increase of shares without transferring anything to tile
holders is not a dividend. Id.
8. An option to the stockholders of taking for each share the sum of $40
of the capital stock upon payment of $4 for each share is not such a stock
dividend a4 is liable to taxation. Coin. v. Erie 4- PittsburahR. R., 717.
9. It is not a presumption that an increase of stock is a stock dividend, it is
a question of fact for the jury. Id.
10. It is for the legislature to determine what property, real or personal,
.hall le subject to and what shall be exempt from taxation. Brick Co. v.
In.hbitants qf Brewer, 735.
1I. Exemption of property from taxation is the imposition of increased
taxation upon the non-exempt property. Id.
12. The legislature cannot constitutionally transfer to municipal corporations the power of determining upon what property, real or personal, taxes
shall and upon what they shall not be imposed. i.
13. Where the constitution of the state requires taxes, voted by the legislature, to be assessed upon all taxable property in the town, or district, subject to the tax, rateably, or in proportion to the value of the estate or in any
other sinilar manner, it is not competent for the legislature, with the assent
of towns,,where real estate is situated and liable to taxation, to provide, even
by a gcneral law, applying to the tyhole state, that manufacturing establishment,, going into operation after the (late of the statute, and the consent of
the town, together with the capital invested in such establishments, shall be
exempt from taxation, while other similar establishments, already existing in
such towns, remain subject to such tax. Such exemption is, virtually, the levy
of an increased tax upon all the taxable estate in the town, and to that
extent, depriving the owner of its value without any equivalent benefit,
either directly or indirectly. Id.
14 It is essential to all just taxation that it be levied with equality and
uniformity. Id.
TENDI)ER.

See FRAUD, 1.

TERRITORIES.
1. The territories, even after being org nized by Congress, possess none of
the attributes of sovereignty. They cannot, therefore, enact laws for the forfeiture of lands of aliens. Montana v. Lee, 487.
2. The nature and extent of territorial governments discussed, their powers
defined and explained. Id.
TICKET. See CoMoN CAARIER, 8.
TIMBER.
An assignment of a permit to cut timber transfers to the assignee the trees
afterwards cut under it, and he may maintain trespass against an officer attaching them as the assignor's. Sawyer v. Wilson, 261.
TIME. See BILLS AND NOTES, 12. LAOUEs, 4.
1. Suit brought Oct. 6th 1868 on a note due Oct. 6th 1862, is not barred
by the statute. Menges v. Frick, 399.
2. The day on which the cause of action arose is to be excluded from computation. .1d.
3. When a thing is to be done within a certain time from a prior day,-the
day is to be excluded. Id.
4. Where a debtor executes a bill of sale to secure the payment of a sum
of monpy, and expressly provides that if it is not paid " immediately upon
demnand in writing " that the creditor should seize and sell the goods, a
demand in one week and a sale in eight (lays thereafter will be held to be a
reasonable allowance of time. Wharlton v. Kirkwood, 592.
5. Congress, under the Reconstruction Acts, approved the Constitution of
Virginia on April 10th 1869, and ordered it to be submitted to the people.
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TIME.
On July 6th 1869 it was submitted and adopted by a large majority of the
people, who on the same day elected a governor, legislature and. other state
officers. The governor was inaugurated in September 1869, and the legislature met in October 1869, and passed acts ratily ng the 14th and 15th Amendmcnts-all of these preliminaries being, required by the Reconstructions Acts
before the admission of the state to representation in Congress. Congress,
on January 26th 1870, passed an act admitting the state to representation.
The constitution contained a provision for homestead exemption, but this was
not applicable to debts incurred prior to the time the constitution went into
effect. Held, that as to this clause the constitution went into effect on the day
of its ratification by the people, July 6th 1869. In ReDeckert, 624.
TITLE. See FRAUD, 3. HUSBAND AND WIFE, 30. LI.4ITATION, I. RAILROAD, 12.
SALE, 1. VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 14, 23, 25.
TORT.
1. Where the law imposes upon a party an obligation which he neglects;
and damage results to another, an action on the case founded in tort lies.
Philada., W. 4- B. . R. Co. v. Cousle, 784.
2. The fact that.fire from a railroad was first communicated to a neighbor's
land, and then to the plaintiff's timber, does not affect the railroad's responsibility to plaintiff. Id.
TOWN. See ESTOPPEL, 7. HIGHWAY, 8, 23. SIDEWALK, 1.
TRADE-MARK.
1. A manufacturing company will be protected in the use of a certain trademark, though part of the trade-mark consists of a family name. Aferiden
Manufg. Co. v. Parker, 153.
2. Equity will restrain the use of the same name in so far as it forms a
material part of the trade-mark, and will necessarily injure the company,
even though another may acquire the right of that name from parties to whom
it legitimately belongs. Id.
3. It is not every use of the name, however, that will he held to necessarily
infringe the trade-mark, or that will be restrained by injunction. Id.
4. Though equity will not protect a trade-mark which deceives the public,
it is not every erroneous impression which may he drawn from the use of a
trade-mark, that will he sufficient to destroy its validity. Id.
5. The employment of a family name as a component part of a trade-mark
is no fraud upon the public, though the famil. does not actually make the
articles bearing the name, provided they are the result of their skill and experience. Id.
6. The complainant, a company engaged in manufacturing plated forks and
spoons, acquired the right to the use of the trade-mark-"1847 Rogers Bros.
A. l."-subsequently the respondent by an arrangement with three brothers
named Rogers, manufactured plated spoons marked "C. Rogers Bros. A. I,"
Held, that this was an infringement of complainant's trade-mark, and that the
use of the term " Rogers Bros." should he restrained. hI.
7. The name of an incorporated town or borough cannot be employed as a
trade-mark even if adopted and used as such prior to its use in a geographical
sense. Glendon Iron Co. v. Uhler, 543.
TRESPASS. See EVIDENCE, I. HUSBAND AND WIFE. 44. TIMBER.
1. A count, in a suit against a sheriff on his official bond, is not a count in
trespass, though it allege that the authority of the sheriff was void or illegal.
Price v. Stone, 61.
2. One who commits a wilful and malicious trespass upon another's property will e held responsible for all injury resulting to third parties in consequence thereof. Munger v. Baker, 199.
3. A landowner who has had the actual location of certain land for more than
twenty-five years, is entitled to an injunction to restrain another from buildig on the land, until he establishes his right at law. Southmayd v. McLausghIun, 199.
4. An officer who sues attached property without the notice required by
law, becomes a trespasser ab initio. Sawyer v. Wilson, 261.
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TRESPASS.
5. Notice of sale, defective from want of sufficient time, is not cured by
a postponement to a day sufficiently remote. No valid sale can be made at
the adjournment. Sawyer v. Wilson, 261.
6. In trespass q. c.f. when the declaration counts upon a single act of
trespass which is justified, the plaintiff cannot traverse it, and new assign.
Spencer v. Bemis, 654.
7. The amount of force one has a right to employ in self-defence, depends
on the perilous condition he has reason to suppose himself in. Edwards V.
Leavitt, 719.
8. Evidence showing the animus of the defendant towards plaintiff; is admissible in trespass for assault and battery. 7d.
9. Exemplary damages may be recovered in trespass. Id.
TROVER. See BAILMENT, 4, 5. RECEIPT, 2.
1. A commission merchant who sells before notice of the revocation of his
authority is not liable in trover for the goods sold. Jones v. Hodgkins, 262.
2. A purchaser under such sale acquires a good title as against a prior
purchaser from the consignor without delivery. Id.
3. The receipt of a note from the payee, who has. illegally soid a wagon
of the plaintiff's, is not such a ratification as will prevent his maintaining an
action of trover for the wagon. Abbott v. iMfay, 463.
4. The owner of negotiable securities which have been stolen, may follow
and reclaim them wherever he finds them, and the burden is on the holder to
show that he took them in the usual course of business for value. Robinson
v. Hodqson, 463.
5. In trover for such securities merely showing they were in possession of
another from whom defendant received them is no defence. Id.
6. A holder's possession is primdfacieevidence of ownership, the presumption being that it was honestly acquired. Id.
TRUST AND TRUSTEE.
1. If trustee is authorized to change investment, upon written consent of
cestui que trust, he is liable unless such consent is obtained. Crocker v. Pierce,
128.
2. Equity will set aside a release given to a trustee, where there is "inadequacy of price and inequality in the advantage of the bargains," by which
the release was obtained. Id.
3. Trustees are not allowed to purchase the property of their cestuis que trust
upon principles of public policy. Pairor. Vickery, 200.
4. Equity discountenances transactions between trustees and cestuis que trust,
and the onus of showing their perfect bona fides is on the trustee. Id.
5. Lapse of time and death of parties are grounds for refusing relief
against trustee, especially if injustice might be done by interference of the
court. Id.
6. INVESTMENTS By TRUSTEES, 201.

7. A resulting trust does not arise in favor of one of two joint purchasers
unless his part is definite and what money he pays is paid for some aliquot
part of the property. Olcott v. Bynum, 335.
8. In no case can it arise for more than the money actually paid. Id.
9. Where a deed of trust provided that certain money should be paid in
instalments, and in default the whole premises might bb sold, on a sale by
the trustee he may retain out of the proceeds not only the instalment due but
the entire amount. Ad.
10. Under certain circumstances a sale of a large and valuable tract in a
deed of trust may be proper to be made for cash, and on the premises, though
in a remote part of Virginia. Id.
11. Where a bill is filed for an alleged breach occurring thirty-seven years
before, and after the trustee is dead, it will be dismissed on the ground of
laches. Hume v. Beale's Executrix, 336.
12. And this although the cestuis que trust were women and the trustee a
lawyer. Id.
13. A voluntary deed of trust, reserving no power of revocation, made with
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TRUST AND TRUSTEE.
a nominal consideration and without legal advice as to its effect, and where
there was evinence that its effect was misunderstood by the grantor, was set
aside and a reconveyance ordered. Garnsey v. Mndy, 345.
14. The fact that the grantor's infant children were the beneficiaries under
the trust-deed was not sufficient to prevent therelie.
Id.
15. Where artifice or trick is resorted to in procuring property at sheriff's
sale at an under value, the purchaser takes as trustee ex maloflcio. Faust v.
Haas, 456.
16. Unless the discretion of a trustee is so trammelled by a promise to exercise it in a particular way, equity will not disqualify him. Williams's Appeal,
463.
17. A chancellor will so control a trustee as to prevent his disappointing
the intent of the donor. Id.
18. A verbal direction of a testator and promise of the executor to perform
are not a fraud upon a power in a will. Id.
19. Where the husband of one of the resiguary devisees who had means
agreed to pay the expenses of litigating a dev Ise to a charity, and if successful to pay himself out of the same and divide the balance with his wife and
the otbfer devisees,.there is sufficient consideration for his agreement to be
trustee. Dickey's Appeal, 464.
20. The husband must proceed until released by all the parties.
d.
21. Any purchase of the land in dispute would enure to the benefit of all.
Id.
22. A deed of trust from husband and wife, with power for trustee to sell
on request of wife, includes a power to mortgage at her request. Zane v.
Kennedy, 464.
23. Absolute power to sell includes power to mortgage. Id.
24. If a mortgage is given to secure the'payment of notes of the wife's son,
and they are extended without consideration, she will not e discharged if
she were surety. Id.
25. Trustee is only chargeable with simple interest for failure to invest
trust-funds. Smith and Barber, Exs., v. Darby, 784.

UNIVERSITY.

See

COIaTITUTIONAL Liw, 38.

USURY.
1. The payment of a premium to the assignee of a mortgage will not render
it usurious. Conover v. Hobart, 196.
2. The terre tenant of the land cannot set up usury as a defence to a suit on
a mortgage. Id.
3. As a defence must be specially pleaded.. The Confederate Note Case,
707.
4. Where the agent of the borrower negotiates a loan for the highest legal
rate of interest, and without the knowledge of the lender also retains a fee for
his services, the loan is not usurious. Sage v. Wright, 719.
5. The borrower will be bound by the representations of his agent made
to the lender, that the debt was honest and would be paid. Id.
VENDOR ANT) PURCHASER.
I. Of Real Estate.
I. A vendor who unwarrantably refuses to accept the purchase-money and
make conveyance, is not entitled to interest on the purchase-money from the
time it was to be paid until he is compelled by final decree to convey. King
v. Ruckman, 63.
2. If part of the purchase-money was to be secured by a mortgage payable
in five years, and there has been a delay of that amount of time before final
decree, the vendor is not entitled to cash. Id.
3. The measure of damages for refusal to convey is the same as in case of
sale of personal property, when the equity of the case permits. Id.
4. No compensation will be allowed for lands which the vendor had contracts for, but was unable to convey. Id.
5. A vendor who takes possession of land under articles of sale is not lia" e for use and occupation. Carpederv. United States, 336.

INI) EX.
VENDOR AND PURCIIASER.
6. The vendor's lien exists against a purchaser having notice of the deed
which shows on its face that the consideration is yet to be paid. Cordova v.
Hood, 336.
7. Taking a note from vendee with security is not allabsolute abandonment
of tile
lieu. Id.
8. The prequinption of abandonment of the lien, may be rebutted by the
vendor's testimony if it is positive. Id.
9. Part payment of the note and taking a new one does not displace the
lien. Id.
10. Where purchaser accepts a deed which recites the conveyance of "all
of a certain lot which has not been conveyed to other persons by the grantor,"
he will be deemed to have notice of a prior grant. Quinlan v. Pierce ital.,
719.
11. Equity will rescind a contract for the purchase of land, made on the
faith of representations by the vendor, which are fraudulent and false. Risch
v. w,Lilienthal et ux., 720.
12. The fact that purchaser visited the land himself is not conclusive, that t
he did not finally purchase on thefaith of the repre.,entations. Id.
13. Mlere inadequacy of consideration is not sullicient ground for rescinding a contract. Id.
IL Of PersonalProperty. See FRAUD, 1. SALE, 6, 9.
14. When anything remains to be done by either or both the parties to a
contract of sale, before delivery, the title does not pass. Gibbs v. Benjamin,
93.
15. So inflexible is this rule, that when the property has been delivered, if
anything remains to be done by the terms of the contract before the sale is
complete, the title of the property still remains in the vendor. The contract
must be executed to effect a complete sale. Id.
16. The mere delivery of goods to the vendee is not sufficient to take a case
out of the Statute of Frauds ; he must accept and receive them. Id.
17. A representation made by a vendor may relieve the purchaser from that
care and caution he would otherwise be bound to employ, but there should be
the clearest proof of his reliance on such representation. Vandewalker v.
Osrner, 200.
18. The purchaser having the property before him, cannot shut his eyes
and ears to defects plainly discoverable, and pretend that he relied on the representation. Id.
19. As in cases of warranty, so in representations, obvious defects are not
cured, because the law requires the purchaser to examine the property if present with such care and skill as a prudent umn would. Id.
20. A bondfide purchaser is one who buys property of another without
and pays a full and ral ,ricte for
notice that some one else has a right to it,
it before notice. S3picer efal. v Wcaters, 263.
21. To constitute a bond fide purcha.ser the consideration must be actually
paid, not merely secured to he paid. Id.
22. If the title of a purchaser is voild as against the vendor's creditors by
reagon of fraud, the defect attaches to every .hsequent purchaser not bond
.ide. Id.
23. If the vendor makes an unconditional delivery of the article, a 5ond,7de
purchaser from the vendee acquircs a vaid title, though tile original vendor
was induced to sell by fraud of tie vendee. Iernard elal. v. Ctamphtell, 263.
tlhat
the rightful owner is ,revented
24. It is on the princille of e-topli,
igaiiit it bond Jide purchaser, after delivery of posfrom a,.,crting hi6 claine
session.
Id.
i.
provured ly frau,,
25. No title pasqes when a sale i.%
26. The design not to pay lor gomds i- such a tratIl as will avoid the sale.

Id.
oltained hy frailud may follow and
27. The rule is that the owner of giood,,
I.
lih.
i,iil ohia-er.
ititat bd
reclaim iheum from any rime

28. Where atvehlr brings a st a..amot atvetee, who has paid by a
mortgage oii real estate, asserting 1*that it was good," the burden of proof
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is on the vendor to show that there was a prior encumbrance which made the
title bad. Bristol V. Braidwood, 528.
29. The rule of caveat emptor applies in such a case. Id.
30. If the vendee says "there is no encumbrance" when he knows there is,
he is liable for a fraudulent representation, and the vendor may rescind and
claim his property. Id.
31. If he says, "1none that he knew of," the vendor is put upon inquiry
for himself and the rule of caveat emptor applies. Id.
VENUE. See CRIMINAL LAw, 10, 12.
VERDICT.
VOTE.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 19, 22.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 12, 19.

WAGER. See AssumPsIT, 3.
1. The common law allowing actions on wagers not contrary to public
policy has never been in force in New Hampshire. Winchester v. Nutter, 53.
2. In New Hampshire all wager conrtacts are void. Id.
3. But one unconnected with a criminal offence is no offence against the
criminal law. Id.
WATERS AND WATERCOURSES.
The rights of the owner of the surface and the owner of mine., do not
differ in any way from those of owners of adjacent closes, and the owner of
the surface cannot be protected against the loss of water by percolation into
the mines. BallacorkishMining Co. v. Harrison, 592.
WAR.

See

CONFEDERATE

STATES,

2.

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW,

1.

MORT-

GAGE, 6.

1. The intervention of the late war was a sufficient excuse to the holder of a
policy of life insurance, for not paying his premiums as they accrued during
the war, the insurer being resident and domiciled upon one side of the military lines, and the insured upon the other. Hancock v. N. Y. Life ins. Co.,
103.
2. WAR CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, 265, 337, 401.
3. The late war between the United States and the Confederate States, was
a public war in such sense that all the people of one section were public
enemies of the people of the other section. Degiverille v. Dejarnelte, 318.
4. An alien enemy, though he may not sue, may be sued and his property
within reach of process subjected to execution during the war. Id.
WARIANTY. See COVENANT, 8. LEGAL TENDER NOTES, 3.
1. Representations made by the vender of a patent fork for elevating grain,
&c., " that it was in all respects a good fork, would do good work in hay,
grass, &c., and was fit for the use intended!" amounted to a warranty. Elkins v. Kenyon et al., 783.
2. If the instrument was of no practical utility for the use intended, the
vendee is entitled to rescind the contract of sale. Ad.
WAY.
1. Where a grant is made of a free passage-way over land, and at the end
of the lane used as such passage-way there is a gate, the maintenance of the
gate is not per se a wrongful obstruction. Coannery v. Brooke, 399.
2. If the gate is not a practical hindrance to the use of the passage it is not
illegal. Id.
3. A grant must be taken most strongly against the grantor if there is any
doubt. .d.
4. Judgment in trespass for taking down the gate is no bar to an action for
the obstruction. Id.
WILL.

1. A devise to the commissioners of a county, to be appropriated by the
commissioners and their successors for the use of the county for ever, vests a
title in fee simple in the county. Hayward V. Davidson, 254.
2. A beneficiary under a will, whose property is given by the will to
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WILL.
another, cannot take and also claim his own property, he must elect. Hutston
v. Cone, 655.
3. It must plainly appear that it was not testator's intention for him tohavo
both. Id.
4. In case of wilow's dower the rule is the reverse. Id.
5. A court of equity has power to compel an election. Id.
6. Such election to be binding must have been made with a knowledge of
the facts and the party's rights. Id.
7. Money borrowed by a husband from his wife and secured by a note, will
after her death be regaried as a claim against him, and a release of it, by
her will, is a beneficial provision for the husband. Id.
8. A testator may provide in his codicil to a will made in January 1873,
that if lie shouhl die within 30 days a former will made in 1871 should be
deemed as his last will. Hamilton's Estate, 720.
9. Charitable bequests made in the will of 1871 were not avoided by the
Act of April 26th 1855. .d.
WITNESS. See IIGHwAY, 24. HUSBAND .ND WIFE, 3.
I. A witness may waive his constitutional right of not being compelled to
give evidence against himself. State v. Ober, 53.
2. He waives it by becoming a witness in his own behalf, and must then
be subject to the tests of other witnesses. Id.
3. Where a witness is asked on cross-examination if he had a certain conversation with a person named and denies it, the deposition of the person with
whom the alleged conversation took place is admissible to impeach the witness, notwithstanding it was taken under a commission at the execution of
which the witness sought to be impeached was not examined. P. 6- C. Railroad v. Andrews, 566.
4. A wife being cmp-wered by statute to sell to her huband a mortgage
which is her separate property, must he held a competent witness for her husband to show that such mortgage was free from usury. Sage v. Wfright, 720.
5. To be competent to prove handwriting must have such knowledge of it
as to form an opinion when he sees it. Gu.yete v. Town of .Bolton, 777.
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